PSY 328 Washington State University Self Control Psychology Research Paper

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Child Dev Perspect. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 March 01.
Published in final edited form as:
Child Dev Perspect. 2015 March ; 9(1): 32–37. doi:10.1111/cdep.12107.
Unpacking Self-Control
Angela Duckworth and
University of Pennsylvania
Laurence Steinberg
Temple University
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King Abdulaziz University
Abstract
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Self-controlled behavior refers to actions aligned with valued, longer-term goals in the face of
conflicting impulses to seek immediate gratification. In this article, we argue that the
psychological processes that contribute to self-controlled behavior can be grouped into two
functionally distinct categories: Volitional processes facilitate self-controlled behavior and include
executive functions as well as learned metacognitive strategies like planning, attention
deployment, and psychological distancing. In contrast, impulsigenic processes undermine selfcontrolled behavior and include reward sensitivity, sensation seeking, and domain-specific
cravings. A disproportionate amount of research has addressed the former at the expense of
understanding individual and developmental differences in the latter. This imbalance is now being
rectified. Distinguishing between self-controlled behavior and its antecedent psychological
processes helps illuminate normative developmental changes in self-control and points to
directions for measurement and intervention.
Understanding and Cultivating Self-Control in Children
“The Cookies” is a popular children’s story in which two characters named Frog and Toad
face a familiar dilemma (1). Both want to keep eating cookie after delicious cookie, but at
the same time, they want to stop before getting sick. “We need will power!” cries Frog, as
he reaches for another cookie. “What is will power?” asks Toad. Frog’s answer: “Will
power is trying hard not to do something that you really want to do” (1, p. 35).
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The will power that so concerns Frog and Toad has interested psychologists since James (2)
and Freud (3). Self-control has become one of the most prolifically researched topics in
developmental psychology (4). In this article, we argue that making sense of this growing
body of empirical findings requires distinguishing the overt expression of self-control from
its underlying psychological processes. Furthermore, we suggest organizing these
psychological processes into two functionally distinct categories: volitional processes that
facilitate self-controlled behavior and, conversely, impulsigenic processes that incline
individuals to enact immediately rewarding but ultimately regrettable actions. We show that
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Angela L. Duckworth, Department of Psychology, University of
Pennsylvania, 3701 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104; duckwort@psych.upenn.edu.
Duckworth and Steinberg
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these distinctions are essential for understanding the maturation of self-control during
childhood and adolescence, and for informing the design of interventions. We conclude by
suggesting ideas for continued investigation.
What Is Self-Controlled Behavior?
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The nomenclature of controlled behavior varies by theoretical tradition (5), with many
developmental psychologists embracing the terms effortful control (6–8), willpower (9), or
ego-resiliency (10), and most personality and social psychologists preferring the term selfcontrol (11, 12). Whatever the moniker, self-controlled behavior refers to voluntary actions
in which individuals engage to advance personally valued longer-term goals despite
conflicting urges that are more potent in the moment. Sometimes, self-control entails
inhibiting an undesired impulse (e.g., suppressing the urge to interrupt another student in
class) and at other times, self-control entails strengthening a desired action (e.g., practicing
piano rather than watching television; 12). Individuals can regulate their own emotions,
thoughts, or physical actions. In every case, the alternative to self-controlled behavior—
impulsivity—typically brings about short-term gratification at the expense of longer-term
goals.
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To conclude that a child is exercising self-control, one must be confident that his or her
personally valued long-term goals are in conflict with competing, short-term desires. This
ambivalence features an essential asymmetry: The child acutely wants the short-term desires
(e.g., to check my Instagram feed), but upon reflection, the long-term goals (e.g., to do well
on tomorrow’s algebra test) are more valuable. As the philosopher Harry Frankfurt (13)
might put it, what the child wants in the moment may not be what the child wants to want
beforehand or afterwards. Therefore, self-controlled behavior is distinct from compliant
behavior, which a child enacts in response to an external authority figure. Self-controlled
behavior also differs from actions taken in the absence of internal conflict between mutually
exclusive actions.
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Developmental research often overlooks these distinctions. Instead, behaviors that may
represent compliance with authority or just the absence of competing inclinations are
interpreted as exemplifying self-control. For example, to assess whether a studious child has
prodigious self-control, one would need to determine how important academic goals are for
that child as well as how comparatively enjoyable he or she finds nonacademic pastimes like
playing video games or texting friends. While not a substitute for such ancillary
measurement, studies tell us that most school-age children and adolescents consider
schoolwork the most important thing they do for the sake of their own futures, but
experience studying and homework as less pleasurable than almost any other waking
activity (14).
Relatedly, when implemented correctly, the preschool delay of gratification task
(colloquially referred to as the marshmallow test) begins with a child choosing from a
selection of treats the one he or she likes best, then confirming that he or she prefers waiting
for more of this treat to indulging in a smaller amount right away (9, 15). Such a procedure
cannot guarantee that the impulse to indulge in immediate gratification is equivalent across
Child Dev Perspect. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 March 01.
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children, but it is more consistent than if only one kind of treat were made available—or if
intentions to wait were not verified. In summary, the failure to assess or control for the
strength of a child’s desire to satisfy a short-term impulse, as well as the subjective
importance of a conflicting long-term goal, may lead to erroneous conclusions about that
child’s capacity for self-control.
What Contributes to Self-Controlled Behavior?
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Self-controlled behavior is an emergent phenomenon. Researchers have proposed a variety
of taxonomies for organizing the diverse contributing processes (e.g., 16). We suggest that a
dual influence framework helps illuminate developmental trajectories. Specifically, we find
it useful to distinguish processes that encourage the pursuit of immediately gratifying urges
from those that encourage actions aligned with more distal goals. Similar models have a
long history in the study of self-control (17–21). The dual influence framework we propose
here is functional, not neuro-anatomical. Our framework (see Figure 1) groups processes
according to whether they facilitate actions aligned with longer-term goals (volitional
processes) or encourage actions that bring about immediate gratification (impulsigenic
processes).
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If, as we argue, observed self-control is the product of the interplay between impulsigenic
and volitional processes, distinguishing between these two countervailing forces is essential
to understanding developmental and individual differences in self-control. In particular,
although lapses in observed self-control are usually attributed to deficiencies in the realm of
volitional processes, they may have more to do with the relative strength of an individual’s
impulsigenic tendencies. For example, individuals with comparable volitional capacity
demonstrate different levels of self-controlled behavior if they differ in sensitivity to
rewards, either in general or with respect to particular types of temptations (22–24).
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Among the psychological processes that facilitate goal-directed action are executive
functions. Executive functions include working memory, response inhibition, and task
switching, and are supported by prefrontal and related brain areas (4, 25). These basic
processes enable individuals to suppress an undesirable urge or strengthen a desirable one.
Collectively, executive functions facilitate self-controlled behavior in the presence of
temptations, allowing individuals to keep abstract goals as active mental representations,
voluntarily suppress undesired impulses, and switch from one schema to another in
accordance with goal-related objectives. At all stages of life, executive functions as
measured by performance tasks like the Stroop, dimensional card sort, and go/no-go tasks
correlate reliably with ratings of self-controlled behavior by informants (5, 16). However,
these associations are small, suggesting that exercising self-control in the real world, on time
scales, and in contexts that are not easily tested in the laboratory depends on more than
executive function. These findings also suggest that we need more research into executive
function in the context of more affectively laden stimuli than those used traditionally (26).
Self-controlled behavior is also facilitated by diverse metacognitive strategies (27). For
example, in the delay of gratification paradigm, wait time increases dramatically when
children mentally transform the tempting stimulus into something less enticing (e.g.,
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thinking of marshmallows as fluffy white clouds; 9). Children can also wait longer when
they direct their attention away from the treats in view (28). Other tactics take aim at the
physical situation: For instance, by age 6, most children know that waiting is easier if you
cover the treats, putting them out of sight and mind (29). More recently, taking a
psychologically self-distanced (as opposed to self-immersed, egocentric) perspective
facilitated diligence on tedious work tasks (30) and performance on executive function tasks
in young children (31). The same approach facilitated emotion regulation in school-age
children (32).
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In contrast, impulsigenic forces incline individuals to seize short-term rewards rather than
act in their long-term interests. These impulsions can be domain-general (e.g., sensitivity to
rewards of any kind, sensation seeking, anxiety) or domain-specific (e.g., a craving for
sugar, a desire to check Facebook or text friends). Regardless, unlike volitional processes,
impulsigenic forces are automatic and involuntary—they are spontaneously activated in the
absence of any conscious desire to do so. Since so many acts of self-control entail
restraining a harmful behavior rather than initiating a positive one (33), the most obvious
impulsigenic forces are approach-oriented as opposed to avoidance-oriented. However, both
reactive undercontrol tendencies (e.g., restlessness) and reactive overcontrol tendencies
(e.g., fearful responses to novelty) are evident in children as young as 2 years (6, 34). In
either case, volitional processes are required to override impulsigenic tendencies that are
essentially reactive rather than reflective.
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Our dual influence framework is functional rather than neuro-anatomical. We do not claim
that passion and reason have discrete cortical versus subcortical neuro-anatomical substrates.
Indeed, overlapping and highly interconnected regions might subserve impulsigenic and
volitional processes. Nevertheless, prefrontal and associated areas (e.g., dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus) have been associated reliably with self-control
across domains (e.g., not just for emotion regulation but also for delaying gratification and
suppressing thoughts), whereas midbrain and subcortical areas have been associated with
impulsigenic processes (4, 25).
Distinct Developmental Trajectories
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The distinction between volitional and impulsigenic processes has only begun to influence
developmental research on self-control. We know much more about the development of the
former than the latter, with countless studies tracking the growth of aspects of executive
control during early childhood, middle childhood, and adolescence, and showing gradual
improvement across an array of capacities (4, 25). Indeed, the implicit model of self-control
that guides most developmental research wrongly assumes that individuals’ impulsigenic
tendencies remain constant across development, and that what changes with maturation is
not the strength of our impulses but our ability to exercise control over them. Not
surprisingly, then, accounts of improvement in self-control over the course of childhood
focus almost exclusively on volitional processes, leaving open the possibility that increases
in self-controlled behavior may be due to decreases in reward seeking or other forces that
prompt impulsive acts. Similarly, differences among children of the same age in displayed
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self-control are invariably attributed to differences in their regulatory competence rather
than differences in the strength of their urges or their need for immediate gratification.
The distinction between processes that support self-control and those that favor sensitivity to
immediate stimuli has proven useful in studying adolescent risk taking. Because volitional
capacity, as reflected in performance on measures of executive function, increases linearly
between childhood and late adolescence (35), it is difficult to explain why reckless behavior,
which often reflects lapses in self-control, apparently increases temporarily during
adolescence. If overt self-control were merely a function of volitional capability, reckless
behavior should decline gradually over time. However, this is not the case: Many forms of
reckless behavior increase between preadolescence and late adolescence, and then decline
between late adolescence and adulthood (36).
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This apparent paradox can be explained by examining the trajectory of reward sensitivity
rather than the trajectory of volitional capacity. In several studies using a variety of selfreport and experimentally derived measures (37), reward sensitivity and sensation seeking
follow an inverted U-shaped function, increasing between preadolescence and
midadolescence, peaking in either mid- or late adolescence (depending on the measure and
sample), and declining thereafter. In contrast, in the same studies, cognitive control
improves linearly during this same developmental period (as expected). These processes
apparently follow similarly shaped trajectories among both males and females (38) and in
different parts of the world (39), are influenced by different forces—changes in reward
sensitivity are apparently affected more directly by puberty than are changes in cognitive
control (40), and develop independently of one another (41).
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Midadolescence is characterized by what has been described as a maturational imbalance
(35) between reward sensitivity and impulse control (see Figure 2), which is thought to
account for the rise in reckless behavior during this time. Although some have pointed out
that many forms of risky behavior, such as binge drinking, peak later (i.e., in the late teens;
42), this may be due to differential opportunity to engage in certain forms of reckless
activity. If the legal drinking age in the United States were 15 rather than 21, binge drinking
would likely peak much earlier than the early 20s.
Conclusion
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The study of self-control has become a vibrant area of inquiry within the field of child
development. As research on the development of self-control proceeds, studies will need to
distinguish between the observed manifestation of self-controlled behavior and the two
classes of psychological processes that underlie it. Apparent lapses in self-control may be
due to deficiencies in volitional processes, but they may also be due to excessively powerful
impulsigenic processes. For example, overweight children eat too much. But they eat too
much both because they cannot control their appetitive impulses (43) and because they have
larger appetites to begin with (22). More generally, as Frog wisely observes in “The
Cookies,” self-control depends both on how much you want something and also on how
much you really want not to want it.
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We see two important priorities for ongoing research. First, more energy should be directed
to developing interventions that redirect impulsigenic processes or, at a minimum, recognize
that self-control is a tug-of-war between mutually incompatible desires. Advances have been
made in training executive function (25) and in teaching children specific metacognitive
strategies (27). Much less is known about how to weaken immediately gratifying impulses,
including whether it is possible to do so. Mindfulness practices, which encourage full
attention to the present moment without judgment, may strengthen volitional processes and
attenuate impulsigenic ones (44). Mindfulness interventions have targeted adults primarily,
but interventions are now being adapted for adolescents and even young children (44; see
additional publications in the same special issue). Another promising area of inquiry is
redirecting sensation-seeking tendencies from harmful to more benign ends—perhaps a fastpaced game of pickup basketball can fulfill the same needs as joy riding or binge drinking
(39).
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Second, we need novel measures to distinguish the strength of an individual’s desires from
the power of his or her ability to keep them in check. Many commonly used questionnaires
assessing self-controlled behaviors are blunt instruments ill suited to distinguishing
volitional from impulsigenic processes. However, researchers can ask individuals to
introspect, parsing their desire to do something from their desire not to do it, either in
retrospect (24) or in real time using experience sampling methods (45). Of course, the
applicability of such self-report methods for young children is questionable, and so we need
to create methods that apply across development. Neuro-imaging (e.g., fMRI) or eventrelated potential may be the ultimate tools for parsing the psychological processes
underlying self-control, and collaborations between neuroscientists and psychologists will
be necessary to learn more about how these processes interact (cf. 35).
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Acknowledgments
The writing of this article was supported, in part, by the Character Lab, the National Institutes of Health Grant 5K01-AG033182-02, the National Institute on Aging-National Institutes of Health Grant R24 AG048081-01, and the
Klaus J. Jacobs Foundation. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily
represent the official views of the funding agencies.
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Figure 1.
A dual influence framework distinguishes between the oppositional forces of impulsigenic
and volitional processes.
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Figure 2.
Different developmental trajectories characterize the growth of sensation-seeking and
impulse control during adolescence (37).
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Motivation Science
2018, Vol. 4, No. 1, 39 – 49
© 2017 American Psychological Association
2333-8113/18/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/mot0000062
Whatever Happened to Self-Control? A Proposal for Integrating
Notions From Trait Self-Control Studies Into State
Self-Control Research
Denise de Ridder, Floor Kroese, and Marleen Gillebaart
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Utrecht University
In this article we discuss recent findings in trait self-control research suggesting that
successful self-control may rely on either handling the self-control dilemma in a smart
and effortless way or on the effortfully inhibiting an immediate urge or an unwanted
response. We then contrast these results with findings from ego-depletion research on
state self-control that up to now has focused on merely (consequences of) effortful
inhibition. In doing so, we aim to shift the focus of recent debate about the underlying
mechanisms of the ego-depletion phenomenon to the broader and more important
question of how successful self-control operates. Specifically, we emphasize that
dealing with personally relevant dilemmas or conflicts is often absent from the egodepletion paradigm, which is crucial for understanding why and how people are able
and willing to prioritize a higher ultimate goal. We first discuss the key role for
handling self-control dilemmas in trait self-control research. Subsequently, we discuss
how self-control dilemmas are seemingly absent from ego-depletion paradigms and
then suggest future directions for self-control research.
Keywords: trait self-control, state self-control, ego depletion, goals
ability to handle self-control dilemmas: situations in which competing behavioral tendencies
create a conflict that needs to be resolved rather
than simply overriding an immediate urge (Fujita, 2011; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). Many
people are confronted with such self-control
dilemmas on a daily basis. People who watch
their weight need to resolve the dilemma of
choosing between an apple, which is in line
with their long-term goal, or a tempting chocolate bar, which would satisfy their immediate
craving for candy. Similarly, people who want
to save money are confronted with spending
decisions, and academics who want to excel in
their work experience a dilemma when their
favorite show is on TV. Handling such dilemmas may occur by overriding prepotent responses that prioritize the immediate option or
by using (automated) strategies. Self-control
can be considered part of the self-regulation
feedback loop that encompasses goal setting,
monitoring, and reducing discrepancies between actual and desired states (Carver &
Scheier, 1982). Specifically, self-control can be
considered the “operate” component within the
test– operate–test– exit loop proposed in models
of cybernetic control (Vohs & Schmeichel,
Self-control is often defined as the self’s capacity to override or change one’s inner responses, as well as to interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies and to refrain from acting on
them (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, &
Tice, 1998; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone,
2004). Obviously, overruling an immediate
urge— even when it is undesired—is not an
easy task, and it has been suggested that one is
able or willing to do so only in view of an
attempt to attain a goal that is more rewarding in
the long term (Carver & Scheier, 1981; de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, &
Baumeister, 2012). A more accurate definition
of self-control would therefore emphasize the
This article was published Online First August 3, 2017.
Denise de Ridder, Floor Kroese, and Marleen Gillebaart,
Department of Social Health & Organizational Psychology,
Utrecht University.
The authors wish to thank Marieke Adriaanse for her
constructive feedback and comments on this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed
to Denise de Ridder, Department of Social Health & Organizational Psychology, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80140,
3508 TC Utrecht, the Netherlands. E-mail: d.t.d.deridder@
uu.nl
39
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
40
DE RIDDER, KROESE, AND GILLEBAART
2003). People with high levels of self-control
are better able to deal with this kind of dilemma,
as witnessed by many studies reporting on the
role of self-control in a wide variety of positive
life outcomes (de Ridder et al., 2012; Tangney
et al., 2004). The success story of self-control
typically relates to measures of trait self-control
as the stable ability to handle self-control dilemmas in such a way that the desired goal is
prioritized. In contrast, research on state selfcontrol, defined as the more transient level of
self-control at a given moment, highlights cases
of self-control failure by emphasizing that selfcontrol relies on effortful inhibition resulting in
a state of ego depletion where people are no
longer able to exert self-control.
In recent years, academic debate about selfcontrol has centered around the question of
whether the phenomenon of ego depletion, defined as lower performance on a task that requires self-control after previous exertion of
self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998), is caused
by exhaustion of resources after an initial act of
self-control, as is posited in the strength model
of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998), or results from temporary flaws in attention and motivation to exercise self-control, as is emphasized in the process model of self-control
(Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). Although this
debate is important for understanding the underlying mechanisms of ego depletion, we argue that urgent questions about essential features of self-control—as for example how a
self-control dilemma is handled—are not addressed in this discussion. We therefore propose
to shift the focus of debate to better understanding successful self-control, through an integration of research on trait and state self-control. In
doing so, we acknowledge the work by Fleeson
(2004) on trait and state approaches to personality that aims to reconcile opposing views on
whether behavior is primarily stable or variable
across situations. Following Fleeson’s reasoning, we argue that state and trait approaches to
self-control would substantially benefit from research within the same paradigm. We observe
that state self-control research typically focuses
on (situations and consequences) of self-control
failure, whereas research on trait self-control
has focused more on understanding selfregulatory success. Until now, this remarkable
discrepancy has hardly been addressed in the
literature, and therefore the exact relation be-
tween trait self-control and state self-control is
not well understood. Whereas one study has
suggested that high trait self-control is associated with a larger self-control resource (e.g.,
Muraven, Rosman, & Gagné, 2007), others
have given the idea that high trait self-control
buffers the depletion effect (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007) or is associated
with more efficient use of the self-control resource (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Still
other studies have suggested that high trait selfcontrol is unrelated to depletion (Stillman, Tice,
Fincham, & Lambert, 2009) or even amplifies
the depletion effect (Imhoff, Schmidt, & Gerstenberg, 2014). These divergent findings are
puzzling and call for a thorough investigation of
how both conceptual and empirical approaches
to self-control relate to each other.
In this article we discuss recent findings in
trait self-control research suggesting that successful self-control may not depend solely on
the effortful inhibition of an immediate urge or
an unwanted response but can also be achieved
by handling the self-control dilemma in much
less effortful, and even effortless, ways when
the self-control conflict is recognized at an early
stage, allowing for a swift resolution of the
conflict (Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015; Gillebaart, Schneider, & de Ridder, 2016). We subsequently contrast these results with findings
from ego-depletion research on state selfcontrol. In doing so, we aimed to identify limitations of the ego-depletion paradigm that may
produce unsuccessful self-control, because the
paradigm does not allow participants to use the
smart and effortless strategies for dealing with
conflict that in fact characterize the success of
trait self-control. We are aware that the egodepletion model entails a specific approach to
state self-control and that other prominent approaches such as the seminal work by W. Mischel exist (e.g., W. Mischel, 1974; W. Mischel,
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). We focus on the
ego-depletion paradigm for two reasons. The
first reason is that the paradigm is still widely
used (despite recent discussion). Second, and
more important, the ego-depletion model allows
for the manipulation of self-control to examine
how state self-control fluctuates over time and
over situations by highlighting two stages—
regardless of how the underlying mechanism
that may explain changes in state self-control
are specified, that is, as a result of a resource
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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO SELF-CONTROL?
that gets depleted or as a result of decreased
motivation (see later for further discussion of
this specific aspect). Specifically, we emphasize
that dealing with personally relevant selfcontrol dilemmas or conflicts is often absent
from the ego-depletion paradigm, which is crucial for understanding why and how people are
able and willing to prioritize a higher ultimate
goal. To this end, we first discuss the key role
for handling self-control dilemmas in trait selfcontrol. Subsequently, we discuss how selfcontrol dilemmas are seemingly absent from
ego-depletion paradigms and then suggest future directions for self-control research.
Trait Self-Control: Efficient Handling of a
Self-Control Dilemma
A large body of evidence exists showing that
trait self-control is associated with many positive outcomes in life, such as academic or work
performance (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005;
W. Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988), maintaining satisfying relationships (Tangney et al.,
2004), health (Moffitt et al., 2011), and even
happiness (Cheung, Gillebaart, Kroese, & de
Ridder, 2014; Hofmann, Luhmann, Fischer,
Vohs, & Baumeister, 2014). Although one
would expect that being able to inhibit unwanted impulses is underlying these success
stories, as is generally assumed in self-control
theories, a recent meta-analysis has suggested
otherwise. This meta-analysis revealed that the
effects of high levels of trait self-control are
strongest in behaviors that are performed automatically, without effort, compared to intentional and deliberate behaviors, with effect sizes
up to more than twice as large (de Ridder et al.,
2012). Specifically, the beneficial effects of
high trait self-control were shown to be more
manifest in behaviors that are performed routinely or habitually, with people with high selfcontrol reporting both stronger adaptive routines (such as fruit consumption habits) and
weaker unadaptive routines (such as smoking
habits). These findings evince a sharp contrast
with the traditional view that people with high
self-control are more effective in intentionally
and effortfully resisting temptations and call for
alternative explanations of the underlying
mechanism of self-control success.
In recent years, several propositions have
been made to elucidate this novel view on self-
41
control, all elaborating on the conception that
effective self-control does not rely only on effortful inhibition but also on ways to prevent the
employment of effortful inhibition by using
more effortless strategies when the self-control
conflict is identified at an early stage. First, in
line with the notion that trait self-control may be
characterized by the increased ability to make
behavior automatic (Baumeister & Alquist,
2009; de Ridder et al., 2012), several studies
have demonstrated that the effects of trait selfcontrol on behavior are mediated by habits
(Adriaanse, Kroese, Gillebaart, & de Ridder,
2014; Galla & Duckworth, 2015; Gillebaart &
Adriaanse, 2017), thus exemplifying the notion
that self-control exerts its positive influence on
behavior by taking advantage of effortless routines. For example, a study by Adriaanse et al.
(2014) showed that the inverse relation between
trait self-control and unhealthy snacking could
partly be explained by habit strength, such that
people with higher trait self-control had weaker
habits of consuming unhealthy snacks, which in
turn was associated with lower intake of unhealthy snacks. This is an interesting notion that
underscores the effortless self-control proposition: Apparently, people with high trait selfcontrol eat fewer unhealthy snacks not because
they successfully inhibit their urges all the time
but instead they are simply less inclined to make
unhealthy choices as part of their automatic
routines. However, it should be acknowledged
that the literature has not yet provided direct
evidence that people with high self-control are
faster to form these adaptive habits, or break
undesirable ones, compared to people with low
self-control.
Other studies have suggested that people with
high self-control are less tempted by opportunities for immediate gratification and thus experience self-control dilemmas to a lesser extent
than do people with lower levels of self-control
(e.g., Milyavskaya, Inzlicht, Hope, & Koestner,
2015). For instance, in an experience sampling
study in a sample of German adults it was
demonstrated that people with high self-control
tend to experience fewer and weaker problematic temptations in their environment, because
they strategically structure their lives to steer
away from these vices and thus do not need to
exert effortful inhibition to the same extent as
do people with low self-control (Hofmann,
Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012). In a similar
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42
DE RIDDER, KROESE, AND GILLEBAART
vein, it has been suggested that self-control is a
proactive trait that helps to avoid problematic
desires: For example, people with high selfcontrol were shown to prefer working in a
room that had few (vs. many) distractions,
relieving them of the necessity to deal with
temptations that might otherwise have compromised their task performance (Ent,
Baumeister, & Tice, 2015). Other studies
have supported the notion of smart selfcontrol strategies that focus on modifying circumstances before a problematic dilemma occurs rather than relying on resolving the
conflict when it reaches a critical level (Duckworth, Gendler, & Gross, 2016). Furthermore,
recent research has implied that the relation
between self-control and various goaldirected behaviors (exercising, studying,
healthy eating) are mediated by lower experienced aversion toward these behaviors (Gillebaart & Kroese, 2015), again suggesting
that people with high self-control do not necessarily need to invest more effort into the
performance of such behaviors but rather
have developed ways that make it easier for
them to be successful.
Third, recent work has propounded yet another, slightly different angle. Whereas the studies just discussed suggest that high self-control
is related to absence of conflict— because people with high self-control are not tempted by
opportunities for immediate gratification to the
same extent as are people with low selfcontrol—this latter approach suggests that people with high self-control do experience conflict
to a similar extent as do people with low levels
of self-control do but are able to deal with this
conflict more efficiently, allowing for faster
identification and resolution of the conflict. That
is, the daily lives of people with high selfcontrol are probably not void of all self-control
conflicts, because in many cases such dilemmas
can simply not be avoided (Gillebaart & de
Ridder, 2015). For instance, a person may develop routines to avoid passing by the bakery
shop in order to not be tempted by the delicious
chocolate cookies in the window but may nevertheless be offered a piece of birthday cake
when visiting a friend, creating a self-control
dilemma. It is important to note that in these
situations, people with high self-control still
tend to make better choices than do people with
low self-control. Gillebaart and colleagues
(2016) were able to demonstrate that people
with high trait self-control were faster in identifying and resolving response conflicts that
arose when asked to categorize healthy and
unhealthy food items as positive or negative. By
tracking people’s computer mouse movements
when categorizing the food items, Gillebaart et
al. demonstrated that, rather than not experiencing conflict at all, people with high and low
self-control initially experienced conflict to the
same extent. Of importance, however, people
with high self-control were faster to implicitly
identify the conflict, providing them with better
opportunities for resolving the conflict, as reflected by faster resolution of the conflict (i.e.,
faster categorization of the food item as positive
or negative). This process of response conflict
resolution in people with high trait self-control
was effective to such an extent that on an explicit level, people with high self-control reported experiencing weaker conflicts. This recent study thus suggested that the critical aspect
of high trait self-control may lie in the ability to
identify a self-control dilemma earlier, allowing
for faster, smart, and effortless strategies to deal
with it. This is in line with theoretical notions
stating that the experience of conflict is a prerequisite for engaging in self-regulatory action
(Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009).
Altogether, these new directions in trait selfcontrol research help to shed light on the understanding of how successful self-control operates. Depending on the moment when the
conflict is identified, people may use different
strategies to handle the conflict. At a very early
stage they may turn to truly automated strategies such as habits, whereas in later stages they
may use “smart strategies” that are still relatively low-effort, and in cases of full-blown
self-control conflict people may need to turn to
strategies that require effortful inhibition. The
timing aspect of the self-control conflict process
may prove essential in distinguishing these different ways of handling dilemmas, similar to the
theoretical account by Gross on a process model
of emotion regulation strategies (Duckworth,
Gendler, & Gross, 2014; Gross, 1998). However, we do not wish to elaborate on the timing
aspect here but rather point out that regardless
of the specific stage, good handling of the
conflict is crucial for understanding successful
self-control. We posit that these insights bear
important implications for the study of state
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO SELF-CONTROL?
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self-control in the ego-depletion paradigm. Before we present a number of suggestions on how
to integrate research on trait and state selfcontrol (particularly taking into account the
novel perspective on effortless strategies), we
discuss some limitations of the ego-depletion
paradigm that currently preclude such conceptual integration.
State Self-Control: Where Is the Dilemma
in the Ego-Depletion Paradigm?
In contrast with research on trait self-control,
which has made significant steps in understanding why and how high trait self-control leads to
self-regulation success, research on state selfcontrol has witnessed several controversies
about the nature and the workings of selfcontrol. These discussions typically do not
question the existence of the behavioral phenomenon (i.e., that under certain conditions performance on a second demanding task may be
hampered after having done an initial effortful
task) but primarily relate to the question of
which processes are underlying the egodepletion phenomenon. For example, there has
been debate about whether self-control depletion results from the exhaustion of resources
(Baumeister et al., 1998) or from shifts in motivation and attention for exerting self-control
after an initial act of self-control (Inzlicht &
Schmeichel, 2012), whether ego depletion is
caused by naïve beliefs about how self-control
operates (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010), and
whether ego depletion is different from fatigue
(Clarkson, Hirt, Austin Chapman, & Jia, 2011).
Our goal was not to reiterate these discussions
but rather to focus on the way self-control is
assessed in ego-depletion research. In doing so,
we aimed to uncover the extent to which the
paradigm allows for handling a self-control dilemma as is suggested by trait self-control studies.
Studies on ego depletion typically use a dual
task paradigm. This paradigm holds that participants have to engage in an initial task that
requires self-control (e.g., resisting chocolate
chip cookies or crossing out e letters in a text
conforming to complex rules; Baumeister et al.,
1998), which is considered a manipulation of
the self-control resource. Subsequently, participants perform a secondary task that also requires self-control (e.g., completing an anagram
43
or holding a hand grip). Performance on this
second self-control task serves as the dependent
variable. The paradigm reflects the view that
self-control is a resource rather than a skill and
that this resource is generic in nature and not
specific to a certain task (Baumeister et al.,
1998) but also accommodates related views on
state self-control that allow for the influence of
motivation, attention, and self-control beliefs by
introducing slight variations to the task (e.g.,
Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). Although metaanalytic evidence has supported the existence of
the ego-depletion effect within the dual task
paradigm (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010), its validity has also recently been
contested in a number of critical reviews (Carter
& McCullough, 2013, 2014; Hagger et al.,
2016). We do not aim to discuss the validity of
the dual task paradigm in general here but rather
want to allude to several aspects of the task that
complicate the employment and identification
of smart strategies for handling a self-control
dilemma, as highlighted by recent advances in
trait self-control research. Our point of departure thus is not to contest the ego-depletion
phenomenon as such but rather to illuminate
methodological limitations of the paradigm that
prevent an accurate assessment of dealing with
self-control dilemmas.
We have identified two main problematic aspects of state self-control research that interfere
with the notion that self-control involves smart
resolution of self-control dilemmas: It is not so
much about dilemmas, and it does not allow for
using smart strategies.
Does ego-depletion research involve a selfcontrol dilemma? The first concern is about the
critical sequential setup of the dual task paradigm. Whereas this sequence serves the central
idea of the strength model that after initial exertion of self-control, the resource gets depleted,
one may wonder to what extent the paradigm
simply examines how people deal with performing two subsequent different tasks rather
than assessing how they deal with a self-control
dilemma (the secondary task) in a state of low
self-control (because of the initial task). There
are several reasons for considering this question. The first reason is that this setup does not
allow for examining whether the first task in
fact leads to low self-control, because the dual
task paradigm does not generally entail a manipulation check (for exceptions, see Halali,
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44
DE RIDDER, KROESE, AND GILLEBAART
Bereby-Meyer, & Meiran, 2014; Schmeichel,
Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003)— or rather the manipulation check and the dependent variable
cannot be disentangled. Strictly speaking, one
thus has no evidence that the initial task leads to
a state of low self-control, as is assumed, making it more difficult to appreciate whether poor
performance on the secondary task is indeed
due to low self-control or due to different reasons.
The second reason—related to the first
one—is that the very requirement that the paradigm should involve two different tasks rather
than two similar tasks (Baumeister et al., 1998)
may produce poor performance on the second
task (Dewitte, Bruyneel, & Geyskens, 2009).
Research has shown that if people are allowed
to engage in two similar tasks requiring selfcontrol, a decline in performance is not observed (Dewitte et al., 2009; for a review see
Kiesel et al., 2010), suggesting that poorer performance on the second task does not provide
evidence of low self-control but rather of decreased performance due to task switching. Related to this point is the issue that the time frame
of doing two subsequent tasks has never been
explicitly addressed in ego-depletion research,
although the time spent on a task critically affects performance on a task after completion of
an initial task (Langner, Steinborn, Chatterjee,
Sturm, & Willmes, 2010; Lorist et al., 2000).
A third and more important reason lies in the
second task that is used as the dependent variable in the dual task paradigm. This second task
often seems to be unrelated to self-control in
terms of inhibiting responses in view of a longterm goal because a long-term goal is absent
from the paradigm. If self-control is defined in
terms of handling a dilemma (inhibiting an immediate response in view of a goal that is more
important in the long run), then a task assessing
self-control should incorporate goals rather than
only inhibiting a response “for nothing.” For
instance, it is difficult to imagine in what way
holding a handgrip a bit longer or solving more
anagrams relates to any long-term goal people
may have. Studies on the role of motivation in
ego-depletion research support this line of reasoning. If people are more motivated for the
secondary task— either because the task is important to them or is made more important by
providing them with incentives—the depletion
effect is diminished or disappears (Muraven,
2008; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). In extreme
cases one may even argue that quitting early on
the second task is actually a good example of
successful self-control because participants
have better things to do in their lives than solving anagrams in the lab (e.g., studying for an
exam, going running to improve their physical
condition, or any other activity that is in line
with their long-term goals). We argue that,
taken together, there are serious objections to
the dual task paradigm in terms of whether it
presents people with a true self-control dilemma, thus threatening the external validity of
the task (cf. Hommel, 2015). If people are required to engage in two subsequent trivial tasks
that do not speak to their long-term goals, one
may seriously wonder whether they experience
any dilemma that needs to be regulated and thus
any need to exert self-control.
Our reservations about the validity of the dual
task paradigm are fueled by the scarcity of
studies on the depletion phenomenon outside
the lab. As far as we know, there are only two
published studies that have manipulated ego
depletion in a real-life setting (Janssen, Fennis,
Pruyn, & Vohs, 2008; Salmon et al., 2015).
Both were conducted in a consumer psychology
setting and showed that consumers who were
depleted— by applying a speech control manipulation (Salmon et al., 2015) or letting people
respond to a series of questions (Janssen et al.,
2008)—were more easily persuaded by heuristics. That is, Salmon et al. (2015) showed that
depleted consumers were more likely to follow
a social proof heuristic that led them to buy a
healthy low-fat cheese product, and Janssen et
al. (2008) demonstrated that depleted passersby
were more likely to donate to charity when it
was promoted by an authority heuristic. These
studies suggested that depleted people relied
more strongly on automatic processing (heuristic thinking) compared to nondepleted people.
Although this is promising, one can conclude
that the evidence for ego depletion outside of
the lab is still scarce (but see Danziger, Levav,
& Avnaim-Pesso, 2011, and Vohs et al., 2008,
for field studies on decision fatigue and depletion). Moreover, these results point toward another relevant issue slightly beyond the scope of
this article’s aims, namely that depletion does
not necessarily lead to self-control failure in the
sense that depleted people always make choices
that are bad in view of their long-term goal. In
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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO SELF-CONTROL?
fact, depleted participants in Salmon et al.’s
study who were presented with a heuristic made
better (i.e., healthier) choices than did nondepleted people.
Does ego-depletion research allow for using
smart strategies? This leads to our second concern, which relates to whether the dual task
paradigm allows participants to truly deal with a
self-control dilemma in smart, effortless ways
(e.g., by relying on their automatic processing).
Specifically, the paradigm does not give people
the opportunity to rely on their adaptive routines
when they have to deal with unfamiliar and
often trivial or artificial lab tasks. One may even
argue that the paradigm interferes with smart
and automatic dealing with conflict, because it
presents people with odd tasks that they are not
used to handling in their everyday lives. Keeping the findings on early conflict identification
and effortless handling of the conflict in mind,
as suggested by the study from Gillebaart et al.
(2016), it may well be that the ego-depletion
paradigm prevents people with high self-control
from using their smart routines for conflict handling, as is suggested by a recent study by
Imhoff and colleagues (2014). This study
showed that people with high trait self-control
showed stronger depletion effects (i.e., performed worse on the second task in a dual task
paradigm) compared to people with lower trait
self-control. The authors explained this finding
by suggesting that, because people with high
self-control typically rely on effortless, adaptive
routines, they are in fact less well trained to deal
with acute self-control dilemmas that are unfamiliar to them. Thus, it is important to realize
that the dual task paradigm may not be suitable
to detect potentially smarter and faster conflict
resolution strategies that might typically underlie successful self-control as suggested by trait
self-control studies.
Implications and Directions for
Future Research
Considering the emerging findings on smart
and effortless strategies in the context of trait
self-control success, combined with the concerns related to the validity of the ego-depletion
paradigm, we see a number of exciting opportunities for future research, taking the best of
both worlds and moving closer to a more comprehensive view on self-control success and
45
failure. In particular, we suggest that to advance
the understanding of how (successful) selfcontrol operates, research should incorporate
insights from trait self-control into state selfcontrol designs and vice versa. Next, we outline
some research questions that might inspire such
work.
First, research on state self-control should
take into account the notion that self-control
dilemmas may be handled without requiring
effortful control and should offer the opportunity to do so. A crucial question is whether
people with high trait self-control are also able
to engage with dilemmas in smart, effortless
ways when they experience a temporary drop in
state self-control. To this end, it is important to
distinguish between tasks for which routinized,
effortless strategies can and cannot be used. To
investigate to what extent effortless self-control
strategies are still employed when state selfcontrol is low, one should first have participants
become depleted by a task for which they cannot rely on their routines (to make sure they
indeed have to exert inhibitory control causing
low state self-control), whereas after this manipulation, one should employ a task for which
participants are allowed to rely on routines. This
could be done in either a lab setting or a field
setting. For example, studies could employ depletion manipulations after which participants’
behavior is assessed in the lab (e.g., by letting
them do tasks that are familiar to them) or
observed in a natural setting (e.g., prosocial
behavior at a busy train station, spending money
in a store). Such work could reveal to what
extent people high in trait self-control still function successfully (prosocially, economically
sound) when they have had to previously exert
effortful control. Careful consideration should
be given to determining whether these settings
(either lab or field) allow people to rely on their
routines or other effortless self-control strategies (e.g., avoidance). Inspiration for this direction of research can be drawn from studies that
observe use of self-control strategies (e.g., H. N.
Mischel & Mischel, 1987; W. Mischel et al.,
1988).
A second line of research could look at spontaneous, or “natural,” rather than manipulated
situations of low state self-control (e.g., having
to make a series of choices in the supermarket)
and how this lowered state of self-control affects people with low and high trait self-control.
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46
DE RIDDER, KROESE, AND GILLEBAART
State self-control research is currently confounded with the dual task paradigm, but it
would be important to consider how states of
low self-control come about in real life outside
the lab. Resisting a simple temptation or doing
brief tasks that are aversive may not require so
much self-control and thus not result in low
state self-control. Still, many people will recognize the phenomenon of low state self-control
(either in relation to their naïve beliefs of how
self-control operates or not; cf. Job et al., 2010):
feeling like they have less “willpower” after a
strenuous meeting, having difficulty resisting
the urge to snap at one’s nagging kids after a
busy day at work, or impulsively buying cookies when going out for groceries after an exhausting activity. Thus, future research may investigate such naturally occurring states of low
self-control and examine to what extent people
high or low in trait self-control might be differentially affected. For instance, the key to success for people with high self-control may lie in
the fact that even in this lowered state of selfcontrol they are still able to make good choices,
because they have their smart, effortless strategies to fall back on, whereas people with low
self-control do not have such strategies to rely
on when their resource gets depleted, which
leads to a third possible research question.
This third, and equally crucial, question is
whether people with high trait self-control are
less prone to typical depletion effects because of
their effortless strategies. To address this question, one must take another approach. In this
case it would be interesting to consider selfcontrol dilemmas in which people—presumably
as a function of trait self-control—may or may
not have adaptive routines (e.g., making food
choices in a cafeteria), after which a more unfamiliar task (with which people have no prior
experience, and they can therefore not rely on
any routines) could illustrate whether the handling of the initial conflict was depleting or not,
depending on level of trait self-control. Of
course, the ultimate test would then be to examine to what extent an effortlessly solved dilemma affects performance on a subsequent,
equally relevant dilemma for which people have
no adaptive routines.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate
whether people’s levels of state self-control affect their use of effortless self-control strategies,
in the sense that people with high state self-
control may be more prone to using effortless
strategies than are people with low state selfcontrol. Research may therefore either manipulate high and low states of self-control or observe them in a natural setting and subsequently
employ tasks like the ones used in trait selfcontrol research (e.g., implicit assessment of
identifying and resolving self-control conflicts).
Considering all these aspects, we see ample
opportunities for novel research that examines
how trait self-control and state self-control relate to each other and that may reconcile the
divergent findings on their association that hitherto have been reported. Even more important
than resolving the apparent contradictions of the
two distinct approaches to state self-control and
trait self-control is to learn more about whether
insight into the mechanisms that underlie successful trait self-control also apply when people
experience a temporary drop in self-control.
Knowing more about when and why state selfcontrol varies across situations (e.g., novel vs.
well known) or over time as a function of trait
self-control is crucial for enhancing the understanding of self-control success. One final caveat is important in this regard. In this article we
have focused on the shortcomings of the egodepletion paradigm, but in future attempts to
address trait self-control and state self-control
within the same paradigm it may be equally
important to consider the shortcomings of how
trait self-control is assessed and develop more
sophisticated measures of trait self-control than
the ones that now primarily focus on self-report.
Self-report trait self-control measures rely on
the assumption that people have sufficient
awareness of their capacity for self-control to
report it accurately, that it does not vary across
situations or time, and that it does not vary
across categories of self-control challenges
(Hoyle & Davisson, in press). These assumptions are dubious given the low convergence
between self-report measures and behavioral
measures of trait self-control (Duckworth &
Kern, 2011).
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to discuss how
different insights gained from trait self-control
and state self-control research relate to each
other. To this end, we have discussed recent
developments in trait self-control research and
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO SELF-CONTROL?
have identified problematic aspects of state selfcontrol research. Although self-control by definition involves a dilemma between immediate
gratification and (long-term) goal pursuit, the
dual task paradigm does not entail these goals or
such a dilemma. Furthermore, dual task paradigms typically do not allow for employing or
assessing the effortless strategies that people
with high trait self-control tend to use. By highlighting the opportunities that lie in combining
the existing knowledge on trait and state selfcontrol, we believe that a better understanding
of the mechanisms that are involved in selfcontrol success and failure will be possible.
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.217
Received January 11, 2017
Revision received June 26, 2017
Accepted June 26, 2017 䡲
FINAL PAPER INSTRUCTIONS
You will submit a final paper summarizing and applying what you learned this semester. Your paper should be well-written and comprehensive yet concise. You will use
APA style and formatting conventions in your final paper. The paper contributes up to 50 points toward your final grade in the class.
CONSULT THE GRADING RUBRIC OFTEN!
The completion of this paper includes several components:
Collaboratively completed components:
1. Generating a comprehensive outline of the content of the course.
2. As a class, refining the outline.
3. Using the outline to create a ChatGPT-generated draft of the final paper.
4. Discussing the rubric for the final paper.
ChatGPT’s output will serve as the starting point for all students in the class.
Individually completed components:
5. Editing of ChatGPT’s output according to the grading rubric.
6. Applying what you learned to yourself.
7. Adding APA style and formatting.
8. Submitting the final paper on time.
OUTLINE INSTRUCTIONS
I’ve assigned topics to students as follows:
NAME
TOPIC
NAME
TOPIC
Ayala, Andrea
Introduction to self-control
Kieburtz, Patty
Volitional vs. impulsigenic processes
Baltazar, Maria
Introduction to self-control
Kuo, Hung Yin
Volitional vs. impulsigenic processes
Baxter, Maddy
Self-discrepancy theory
Lee, Danika
Implicit theories of willpower
Cook, Marlee
Self-discrepancy theory
Lee, Jeremiah
Implicit theories of willpower
Cooper, Maddie
Self-control as a limited resource
May, Abby
Want-to motivation
Fajardo, Karina
Self-control as a limited resource
Mcbride, Nicole
Want-to motivation
Ferroggiaro, Anna
The strength model of self-control
Orr, Jess
Self-control training
Forbis, Aryana
The strength model of self-control
Ortiz, Yarithzi
Self-control training
Ford, Kirsten
Challenging the resource model
Perrin, Elizabeth
Goal striving
Francis, Sienna
Challenging the resource model
Quinn, Emily
Goal striving
Garrett, Vivian
The replication crisis
Rogers, Ethan
Implementation intentions
Green, Marcus
The replication crisis
Rosmaryn, Jaymie
Implementation intentions
Grimm, Josephine
Self-regulation
Shortell, Ally
Effortless inhibition
Hewitt, Emma
Self-regulation
Stern, Bayley
Effortless inhibition
Hossack, Elizabeth
Self-efficacy
Sucharda, Morgan
Hot/cool processes
Hoverson, Alexis
Self-efficacy
Trujillo, Dylan
Hot/cool processes
Hummel, Carmen
State vs. trait self-control
Wu, Jinyu
Construal
Jansen, Jill
State vs. trait self-control
Yeaton, Alexis
Construal
INSTRUCTIONS: Use the outline template (link in Canvas) to provide reference information and summarize the article for the topic you’ve been assigned. You will submit
your outline in Canvas. Your participation in the activity and the quality of your product will be figured into your final paper grade.
POSTING OUTLINE IN CANVAS: When we finalize the outline, I’ll post it in Canvas for you to reference.
RUBRICS
I have provided a detailed rubric for this assignment, and I recommend that you refer to it frequently as you finalize your paper.
POINTS: You will earn 25 points toward the 50 points allotted to the final paper if you submit the ChatGPT draft of the paper without any modifications (or minimal
modification). Any modifications you make to the ChatGPT draft will provide the opportunity for you to earn additional points toward the final 50 points allotted to the
paper.
GRADING CATEGORIES: I will score your paper on
1. Content Improvement (up to 12 points)
2. APA Style and Formatting (up to 8 points)
3. Application (up to 5 points).
INCENTIVES AND DEDUCTIONS: There are opportunities for earning extra points by participating in the incentive opportunities. These are informal reflections on the
process and the product of ChatGPT. There are opportunities to lose points from your final grade, too. These are logistical components of the process that include your
participation in outline generation and refinement, on-time submission, and academic integrity. Points can be deducted from the 25 starting points.
APPLICATION
In the application portion of the final paper, you’ll apply a topic discussed this semester to your own life and experiences.
APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS: The purpose of this section of your paper is to communicate the impact of the topics you learned about this semester in your own life and
experience. Because this is unique to you, you’ll complete this part of the paper individually. Specific instructions for the application portion of the final paper will be
posted in Canvas.
USE OF CHATGPT
ChatGPT and other AI writing tools are relatively new and it’s unclear how they will impact education. Some instructors consider the use of ChatGPT a violation of
academic integrity, others embrace it as the next wave of tech that will shape the way we teach and learn. I’m a (reluctant) supporter of the new tech and not naïve to
its use, so we’re going to use ChatGPT to write our first draft of the final paper.
GENERATING A CHATGPT DRAFT: We will create the ChatGPT draft in class; however, traffic on the ChatGPT website may thwart that plan! If we are unable to generate a
draft in class, I’ll find another time to enter our outline into the system to generate a draft.
POSTING CHATGPT DRAFT IN CANVAS: After generating the ChatGPT draft, I’ll post it in Canvas. This will be the draft from which you’ll work on your final paper.
CHATGPT DRAFT AS THE STARTING POINT: Everyone will use the same draft of the paper generated by ChatGPT and, from there, work independently on revisions. You
are NOT permitted to generate any other ChatGPT content after the draft has been created.
WHAT IF I WANT TO WRITE MY OWN PAPER?: Fair enough! Consider an entire rewrite as Content Improvement. Be aware, though, that if you use ANY ChatGPTgenerated text from the draft, it needs to be indicated as specified in the rubric!
REVISIONS: The majority of your grade will be dependent on revisions and improvements to the ChatGPT draft. You can incorporate the articles we read in class and/or
lecture material. Additionally, you’ll need to revise the paper to include APA style and formatting conventions.
ACADEMIC INTEGRITY
ACADEMIC INTEGRITY STATEMENT: Academic integrity is the cornerstone of higher education. As such, all members of the university community share responsibility for
maintaining and promoting the principles of integrity in all activities, including academic integrity and honest scholarship. Academic integrity will be strongly enforced in
this course. Students who violate WSU’s Academic Integrity Policy (identified in Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 504-26-010(4) will receive an F in the class, will
not have the option to withdraw from the course pending an appeal, and will be reported to the Center for Community Standards. Cheating includes, but is not limited
to, plagiarism and unauthorized collaboration as defined in the Standards of Conduct for Students, WAC 504-26-010(3). Read and understand all the definitions of
cheating. If you have any questions about what is and is not allowed, ask your course instructor. If you wish to appeal my decision regarding academic integrity, please
use the form available at communitystandards.wsu.edu within 21 calendar days of the instructor’s decision.
THE USE OF CHATGPT: Some professors/instructors consider the use of ChatGPT a violation of academic integrity. Others approve of its use. In this class, I’ve explicitly
asked you to use it.
SO, WHAT CONSTITUTES ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT?:
1. Any ChatGPT-generated text that appears on the original shared ChatGPT draft, will NOT be considered a violation of academic integrity.
2. The use of ChatGPT for revisions is prohibited.
3. Any text/wording in the revision of the paper that is duplicated in someone else’s work (including from an article) is considered plagiarism.
4. Your final paper will be examined through Turnitin.
DUE DATES
COMPONENT
Outline
Refining Outline
Generate ChatGPT Draft
Discuss Rubric
Work Independently
Submit Final Paper
DUE
Sunday, 4/16/2023 by 11:59 p.m. (NO LATE SUBMISSIONS ACCEPTED!)
Monday, 4/17/2023 during class
Wednesday, 4/19/2023 during class (or…)
Friday, 4/21/2023 during class
Between Wednesday, 4/19/2023 and Friday, 5/5/2023
Friday, 5/5/2023 by 11:59 p.m. (NO LATE SUBMISSIONS ACCEPTED!)

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