Hospital Disaster Preparedness Discussion

Add to these posts with journal article as a reference.

Post One :

Comments on key findings

There is a significant improvement of preparedness to disaster by individual hospitals since the start of the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP); I will comment that quality and safe services have been guaranteed to patients or victims of disasters. Since disaster planning programs started in 2002, the individual hospitals have received training and tools to handle emergencies. Private hospitals and organizations are community-based organs that respond quickly to disaster and have more information about the community than the public hospitals. Thanks to UPMC for findings that help the government to implement disaster and response programs.

The Coalitions of Emergency response teams are building a foundation for preparedness; Health facilities have formed coalitions in the effort of strengthening the disaster preparedness services through sharing the HPP programs. Collaborations and coordination between hospitals, both private and public have enhanced the emergency and disaster response teams’ operations. Through the networking of hospitals, training and tools or resources have been shared or acquired. I comment that both the private and public hospitals have played a significant role in enhancing all-disaster preparedness. I congratulate the UPMC for engaging the government for such quality research that has enlightened the healthcare field. Better services are now a guarantee to victims whenever they occur.

In our hospital, the funding sources are well established non-profit organizations based on healthcare services. The government is part of the funding source to our emergency management programs. We also receive grants from individual well-wishers. Stakeholders play a significant role in opening channels through which funds come to our facility to serve our people. Our facility is private and has sustained the quality level of services through such support from other non-governmental organizations. We hope to deliver the best quality and safe services in the future to help our people.

References

Toner E, Waldhorn R, Franco C, Courtney B, Rambhia K, Norwood A, Inglesby TV, O’Toole T.

(2009). Hospitals rising to the challenge: The first five years of the U.S. hospital preparedness program and priorities going forward Prepared by the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under Contract No. HHSO100200700038C.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and

Response: Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015.

Post Two:

Comment on one of the key findings described in the Toner et al. document.

My most focus this semester is the individual preparedness of the hospital regarding emergencies. I choose to focus on the first critical findings in Toner document “disaster preparedness of individual hospitals has improved significantly throughout the country since the start of HPP” (Toner et al., 2009). In this finding, individual hospitals in the US increased emergency preparedness by engaging top leaders such as CEO in planning for disaster preparedness and response, established situational awareness and communication capability to increase efficiency, and improved on the dynamics of disaster planning. Before 2002, individual hospitals had little emergency preparedness, and the introduction of the health development program has agitated the need to be prepared to mitigate emergency impacts and hospital operations. Post-2002, senior leadership has recognized the need for emergency preparedness and developed a new perception of what disaster can cause. The results of the preparedness have been investments to avail resources, rigorous coordination with community emergency plans such with the fire departments, increases quality planning from coordinators, training to staff on specific responsibilities and role in the event of a disaster, improved communication agencies with hospital departments among others. From my analysis, individual hospital preparedness has evolved compared to the past perceptions that were inclined to emergencies.

Identify other funding sources for your hospital emergency management projects.

Individual Hospital management on emergency is expensive. However, hospitals can cover some expenses directly from the facility while others require funding from outside sources such as Feds. Also, commitment from the state, local and federal government bodies is essential to facilitate preparedness in hospital and protect the social welfare of Americans as well as across the globe (Public Health Emergency, 2019). Fundings have to be in the form of resources and equipment’s useful for prevention and responding to emergencies. For example, funding to avail vaccines is a mitigating measure while funding for new construction of a facility is as a result of the occurrence of a disaster.

HHS BARDA: in partnership with public health vaccine to fund a vaccine against Marburg and other related bioterrorism infections to offer a solution in America and across the globe.

Competitive grants from the state, federal, and private organizations are issued to assist in planning and mitigating emergencies such as fire or natural disasters.

State funds for emergency programs.

Emergency medical service fund

References

Public Health Emergency. (March 5, 2019). Public Health and Medical Emergency Support for a Nation  prepared. Retrieved from

https://www.phe.gov/about/pages/default.aspx

Hospitals Rising to the Challenge:
The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program
and Priorities Going Forward
Evaluation Report | March 2009
Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under Contract #HHSO100200700038C
The Center for Biosecurity is an independent, nonprofit organization of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC).
The Center’s multidisciplinary professional staff, with experience in government, medicine, public health, bioscience, law, and
the social sciences, works to affect policy and practice in ways that lessen the illness, death, and civil disruption that would
follow large-scale epidemics, whether they occur naturally or result from the use of a biological weapon. Experts at the Center
publish research findings regularly and are consulted by government agencies, businesses, academia, and the media for independent analyses of issues pertaining to national and global epidemic preparedness and response.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
The Pier IV Building
621 E. Pratt Street, Suite 210
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
443-573-3304
http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org
Acknowledgments
This work was commissioned by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), under Contract No. HHSO100200700038C. This report would not
have been possible without the more than 100 dedicated and committed hospital and state preparedness planners and other experts who contributed their time to provide the Center for Biosecurity project team with critical
insight into the state of U.S. hospital preparedness, or without the participants of the June 2008 Issue Analysis
Meeting in Baltimore, Maryland. The project team would also like to give special thanks to the leadership and
staff of the ASPR Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations components of the Hospital Preparedness
Program and State and Local Evaluation for their guidance and support in the development of this report.
Suggested Citation
Toner E, Waldhorn R, Franco C, Courtney B, Rambhia K, Norwood A, Inglesby TV, O’Toole T. Hospitals Rising
to the Challenge: The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program and Priorities Going Forward.
Prepared by the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under
Contract No. HHSO100200700038C. 2009.
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge:
The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program
and Priorities Going Forward
Evaluation Report | March 2009
Project Team
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
Eric Toner, MD (Principal Investigator)
Senior Associate
Richard Waldhorn, MD (Co-Principal Investigator)
Distinguished Scholar
Crystal Franco (Project Manager)
Senior Analyst
Brooke Courtney, JD, MPH
Associate
Kunal Rambhia
Analyst
Ann Norwood, MD, COL, USA, MC (Ret.)
Senior Associate
Thomas V. Inglesby, MD
Deputy Director and Chief Operating Officer
Tara O’Toole, MD, MPH
Director and Chief Executive Officer
Project Contacts: Eric Toner, MD, and Richard Waldhorn, MD
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Contents
List of Tables and Figures……………………………………………………………………………………………………………iii
Executive Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. v
I. Project Overview
Summary………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2
II. State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the Hospital Preparedness Program
Historical Context…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7
Pre-HPP Hospital Preparedness Research…………………………………………………………………………………. 11
III. History of the Hospital Preparedness Program
Legislative and Funding History………………………………………………………………………………………………. 17
Program Guidance (FY2002–FY2008)……………………………………………………………………………………….. 19
Impact of Guidance Evolution on Data Collection and Reporting………………………………………………… 20
Hospital Preparedness Research Conducted after HPP Implementation……………………………………….. 21
IV. Key Findings
1. Disaster preparedness of individual hospitals has improved significantly
throughout the country since the start of the HPP………………………………………………………………….. 23
2. The emergence of Healthcare Coalitions is creating a foundation for
U.S. healthcare preparedness. ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 36
3. Healthcare planning for catastrophic emergencies is in early stages; progress
will require additional assistance and direction at the national level…………………………………………. 46
4. Surge capacity and capability goals, assessment of training, and analysis of
performance during actual events and realistic exercises are the most useful
indicators for measuring preparedness………………………………………………………………………………… 55
V. Conclusions
1. The HPP has improved the resilience of U.S. hospitals and communities and
increased their capacity to respond to “common medical disasters.”………………………………………. 57
2. The HPP should focus on building, strengthening, and linking Healthcare
Coalitions to lay the foundation for a national disaster health and medical
response system……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 58
3. Administrative adjustments to the HPP could improve the program’s
effectiveness and efficiency. ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 59
4. To prepare the nation to respond to catastrophic emergencies, HHS should
provide continued leadership to assist states in their efforts to address the many
procedural, ethical, legal, and practical problems posed by a shift to disaster
standards and ACFs that is required when demand for care overwhelms available resources……… 60
5. Catastrophic emergency preparedness is a national security issue and requires
the continued funding of the HPP………………………………………………………………………………………… 61
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
i
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Appendix A. List of Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 63
Appendix B. Center for Biosecurity Descriptive Framework for Healthcare
Preparedness for Mass Casualty Events: The Framework and Crosswalk of
Elements of Preparedness………………………………………………………………………………………. 65
Appendix C. Map of Working Group Participants Contacted for Participation…………………………………. 79
Appendix D. HPP Guidance Terminology by Year…………………………………………………………………………. 81
Appendix E. Summary of HPP Program Guidance: FY2002–FY2008………………………………………………. 83
Appendix F.
Summary of Studies on Hospital Preparedness Since the Establishment
of the HPP by Year…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 87
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
ii
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1. Number of Virtual Working Group Participants by Sector………………………………………………….. 4
Table 2. Studies on Pre-HPP Hospital Preparedness by Year………………………………………………………….. 12
Table 3. Hospital Preparedness Program Funding: FY2002–FY2009……………………………………………….. 18
Figure 1. Timeline of Significant Events for Healthcare Preparedness: 1989–2007……………………………… 9
Figure 2. Percent HPP Hospital Participation by Reporting States, Municipalities,
and Territories: 2006 (n = 58)………………………………………………………………………………………… 19
Figure 3. Percentage of Hospitals with Redundant Communications Capabilities by
Number of HPP-Participating States, Municipalities, and Territories: 2006
(n = 58)………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 30
Figure 4. Percent Hospital Use of Corrective Actions/Improvement Plans Following a
Drill or Exercise by Number of HPP-Participating States, Municipalities, and
Territories: 2006 (n = 58)………………………………………………………………………………………………. 36
Figure 5. HHS Medical Surge Capacity and Capability (MSCC) Framework………………………………………. 39
Figure 6. Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Model for Regional Healthcare
Emergencies ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 42
Figure 7. Percentage of HPP-Participating States, Municipalities, and Territories with
a Functional ESAR-VHP System that Allows Volunteer Health Professionals
to Register for Work in Hospitals or Other Facilities during Emergencies: 2006
(n = 62)………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 45
Figure 8. Administrative and Clinical Adaptations to Resource-Poor Situations…………………………………. 48
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
iii
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Hospitals are the backbone of the healthcare response to common medical disasters (i.e., mass casualty events
that occur with relative frequency, overwhelm a single hospital, and require a communitywide health response)
and, in particular, to catastrophic emergencies, such as an influenza pandemic or large-scale aerosolized anthrax
attack. The need for hospitals to be prepared to respond to disasters has increasingly become a priority for hospital leaders. They have been influenced by events such as the 2001 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina and
the increased emphasis placed by accreditation organizations and regulatory agencies on the importance of such
disasters.
Established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 2002, the goal of the Hospital
Preparedness Program (HPP)1 is to enhance the ability of hospitals and healthcare systems to prepare for and
respond to bioterror attacks on civilians and other public health emergencies, including pandemic influenza and
natural disasters. Current HPP priorities include strengthening hospital capabilities in the areas of interoperable communication systems, bed tracking, personnel management, fatality management planning, and hospital
evacuation planning. Past priorities include improving bed and personnel surge capacity, decontamination capabilities, isolation capacity, pharmaceutical supplies, training, education, drills, and exercises.
The HPP was initially administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Congress directed the transfer of the HPP to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) under
the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).2 All 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia,
the nation’s three largest municipalities (Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City), the Commonwealths of Puerto
Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands),
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, have received over $2 billion in HPP funding through grants, partnerships, and cooperative agreements since 2002.
In 2007, ASPR contracted with the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC)
(Center) to conduct an assessment of U.S. hospital preparedness and to develop recommendations for evaluating
and improving future hospital preparedness efforts. The first deliverable was the Center’s Descriptive Framework
for Healthcare Preparedness for Mass Casualty Events,3 which is a description of the most important components
of preparedness for mass casualty response at the local and regional hospital and healthcare system levels (Appendix B). Hospitals Rising to the Challenge: The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program and
Priorities Going Forward is the second deliverable under the contract. It is the Center’s assessment of the impact
of the HPP on hospital preparedness from the time of the program’s establishment in 2002 through mid-2007, as
well as our preliminary recommendations for improving the state of U.S. hospital preparedness going forward.
This evaluation report is based on extensive analyses of the published literature, government reports, and HPP
program assessments, as well as on detailed conversations with 133 health officials and hospital professionals
representing every state, the largest cities, and major territories of the U.S.
1
2
3
The original name of the program was the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program (NBHPP).
Public Law No. 109-417.
Toner E, Waldhorn R, Franco C, et al. Descriptive Framework for Healthcare Preparedness for Mass Casualty Events. Prepared by
the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under Contract No.
HHSO100200700038C. 2008.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
v
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Executive Summary
Key Findings
Disaster preparedness of individual hospitals has improved significantly throughout the country
since the start of the HPP.
Since 2002, individual hospitals throughout the U.S. have made considerable progress in disaster preparedness.
For the most part, hospital senior leadership is actively supporting and participating in preparedness activities,
and disaster coordinators within hospitals have given sustained attention to preparedness and response planning
efforts. Hospital emergency operations plans (EOPs) have become more comprehensive and, in many locations,
are coordinated with community emergency plans and local hazards. Disaster training has become more rigorous
and standardized; hospitals have stockpiled emergency supplies and medicines; situational awareness and communications are improving; and exercises are more frequent and of higher quality.
The emergence of Healthcare Coalitions is creating a foundation for U.S. healthcare preparedness.
One of the most significant factors contributing to strengthened healthcare preparedness is the emergence of
Healthcare Coalitions, which, since the establishment of the HPP, have involved collaboration and networking
among hospitals and between hospitals, public health departments, and emergency management and response
agencies. These coalitions represent the beginning of a coordinated communitywide approach to medical
disaster response. If they can continue to be developed and strengthened around the country, coalitions would
logically become the foundation of a more robust national disaster health and medical response capacity, as
envisioned in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-21),4 to respond to catastrophic emergencies
in which one community’s Healthcare Coalition could come to the assistance of another’s coalition. The HPP has
played a critically important role in catalyzing the creation of these coalitions, which did not exist in most communities before the program’s establishment.
Healthcare planning for catastrophic emergencies is in early stages; progress will require additional
assistance and direction at the national level.
The U.S. healthcare system is not currently capable of effectively responding to a sudden surge in demand for
medical care that would occur during catastrophic events, such as those described in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Planning Scenarios.5 Emergencies of this magnitude would overwhelm the medical
capabilities of communities, regions, or the entire country and require drastic departures from customary healthcare practices. Such a “phase shift” in the provision of care to disaster standards would be unlike anything that
has ever been done in the U.S. It also is extremely difficult to plan for because it involves the development of
clinical standards of care for disasters and a process for implementing such standards, both of which raise complex clinical, legal (federal and state), and ethical issues. Most hospitals and states have begun to address this
problem and have found the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)/ASPR guidance documents,6,7
to be very useful, but none are adequately prepared. While many issues related to developing and implementing
disaster standards are ultimately state responsibilities, continued national leadership and direction are essential
for sustained state and local progress in catastrophic emergency planning.
4
5
6
7
The White House. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21. October 18, 2007.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/print/20071018-10.html. HSPDs were issued by President Bush
to communicate decisions about the nation’s homeland security policies.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). National Preparedness Guidelines.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf. September 2007.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). Altered
Standards of Care in Mass Casualty Events. Prepared by Health Systems Research Inc. under Contract No. 290-04-0010.
AHRQ Publication No. 05-0043. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. April 2005.
Phillips SJ, Knebel A, eds. Mass Medical Care with Scarce Resources: A Community Planning Guide. Prepared by Health
Systems Research, Inc. under Contract No. 290-04-0010. AHRQ Publication No. 07-0001. Rockville, MD: Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality 2007.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
vi
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Executive Summary
Surge capacity and capability goals, assessment of training, and analysis of performance during
actual events and realistic exercises are the most useful indicators for measuring preparedness.
The most useful metrics for measuring individual hospital preparedness were those that were clearly defined and
not overly burdensome for hospitals. Useful HPP metrics included numerical surge capacity and capability goals
(e.g., targets for staff, supplies, and space), training of personnel, and performance during actual events and
structured exercises. Measuring individual hospital preparedness should also be based on the Joint Commission
Standards for Emergency Management, which already significantly overlap with HPP guidances. Assessment
of Healthcare Coalition preparedness should be based on the ability of coalitions to perform critical coalition
functions, such as providing situational awareness during an event and maintaining and operating reliable and
redundant communications systems.
Conclusions
The HPP has improved the resilience of U.S. hospitals and communities and increased their capacity
to respond to “common medical disasters.”
Prior to 2002, most hospitals did not have adequate plans to handle common medical disasters, much less
catastrophic emergencies comparable to the National Planning Scenarios. Over the course of six years, the HPP
has catalyzed significant improvements in hospital preparedness for common medical disasters. Hospitals have
implemented communications systems, incident command system concepts, stockpiles of medicines and supplies, situational awareness tools, and memoranda of understanding for sharing assets and staff during disasters.
The HPP should focus on building, strengthening, and linking Healthcare Coalitions to lay the
foundation for a national disaster health and medical response system.
The development of Healthcare Coalitions has been the single most important step toward preparing the U.S.
healthcare system to respond to catastrophic disasters that require the healthcare assets of an entire region or the
country. A national system of functional Healthcare Coalitions capable of responding to such disasters is unlikely
to develop without further federal support and guidance. To be able to respond collectively to these types of
catastrophes, the coalitions would need to be coordinated and linked with each other through a nationwide
system that could effectively call upon and coordinate all necessary national assets. The development of such a
system would clearly need to be integrated with existing federal and state disaster response programs and with
the development of a more robust national disaster health and medical system, as outlined in HSPD-21.8
Administrative adjustments to the HPP could improve the program’s effectiveness and efficiency.
These changes include: transitioning the HPP grant to a multi-year project cycle, where awardees would have at
least two years to complete grant work; streamlining and coordinating all federal grants that contain guidance for
hospitals and public health agencies; creating or adopting a healthcare-specific National Incident Management
System (NIMS) training program for use by hospitals and public health agencies that participate in the HPP; and
continuing to phase in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) standards for hospital
exercises and drills in the HPP guidance.
8
The White House (2007).
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
vii
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Executive Summary
To prepare the nation to respond to catastrophic emergencies, HHS should provide continued
leadership to assist states in their efforts to address the many procedural, ethical, legal, and
practical problems posed by a shift to disaster standards and alternate care facilities (ACFs) that is
required when demand for care overwhelms available resources.
Hospitals and Healthcare Coalitions are struggling with how best to prepare for catastrophic emergencies that
may require a shift to disaster standards of care. While many of these issues must ultimately be addressed
and resolved at the state and local levels, states continue to struggle with some fundamental issues, including
developing clinical guidelines and procedural or legal frameworks for shifting to and using disaster standards.
HHS should continue to provide leadership and direction on these issues by: creating a resource for planners
across the U.S. to share information on approaches, guidelines, and tools for disaster standards that have been
developed by states, medical experts, professional societies, and others; convening a working group specifically
focused on implementing disaster standards of care and ACFs and on exploring the development of model legislation or draft executive orders that states could use as templates and adapt; and developing a comprehensive
list and description of the common federal and state legal, regulatory, and reimbursement issues associated with
creating and implementing disaster standards of care and ACFs to facilitate state and local level planning efforts.
Catastrophic emergency preparedness is a national security issue and requires the
continued funding of the HPP.
Significant decreases in annual HPP funding levels would likely stall or impair progress in hospital preparedness
and indefinitely delay the country’s ability to cope with mass numbers of sick and injured individuals following
catastrophic emergencies. Hospitals are already investing their own resources in preparedness. It should not be
expected that they can independently maintain and improve upon their levels of readiness for events of national
significance without sustained funding. Building a distinct, robust national disaster health and medical system—
a national network of healthcare and public health institutions capable of reorienting and coordinating existing
resources to respond to mass casualty disasters, as described in HSPD-21—will require planning, staff, supplies,
equipment, time, and, in all likelihood, increases in federal funding.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
viii
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Project Overview
I. Project Overview
Summary
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) contracted with the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center (Center) to conduct a two-year, comprehensive assessment of hospital preparedness in the U.S. from the
time of the establishment of the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) in 2002 through mid-2007 and to develop
tools and recommendations for evaluating and improving future hospital preparedness efforts. Hospitals Rising
to the Challenge: The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program and Priorities Going Forward is
the second major deliverable for the project. It includes our assessment of the impact of the HPP on hospital preparedness from 2002 through 2007 and our preliminary recommendations for improving the state of U.S. hospital
disaster preparedness.
Key project activities include:
1.
Developing and delivering to HHS the Center for Biosecurity Descriptive Framework for
Healthcare Preparedness for Mass Casualty Events (Descriptive Framework), a conceptual
model of local and regional hospital and healthcare system preparedness for mass casualty
events that outlines the essential elements of hospital disaster preparedness
(delivered February 2008). (Appendix B)
2.
Convening a Virtual Working Group (Working Group) of local, state, and regional
hospital preparedness experts to:
a. Assess the accomplishments of the HPP�9 from 2002 through 2007 and the impact of
the program on hospital and community preparedness using the Descriptive Framework
as the basis for the analysis. This assessment and accompanying June 2008 Issue Analysis Meeting,
which comprised a sub-group of the Working Group, culminated in Hospitals Rising to the
Challenge: The First Five Years of the U.S. Hospital Preparedness Program and Priorities Going
Forward (Evaluation Report) (delivered March 2009).
b. Develop a definition (i.e., a goal or vision of success) of preparedness for the U.S.
healthcare system moving into the future, and recommend short- and long-term steps
that should be taken to achieve the new vision of preparedness. The Working Group
findings from the Evaluation Report will inform, but will not be the sole source of
information and analysis for, this definition. The definition and recommendations will
comprise the forthcoming Preparedness Report (to be delivered Summer 2009).
c.
Develop Provisional Assessment Criteria for evaluating the program and determine the
feasibility of adopting its elements as a tool for routine HPP reporting and assessment,
based on the Descriptive Framework and Evaluation Report (to be delivered Summer 2009).
9
The program’s name has changed over time. It was initially the “National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program”
(NBHPP), but was renamed the “Hospital Preparedness Program” (HPP). Recently, the name changed to the “National
Healthcare Preparedness Program” (NHPP). Throughout this report, we refer to the program as the “HPP.” The HPP was
originally administered by HHS’s Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), but was moved to HHS’s Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), where it now resides, pursuant to the December 2006
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
1
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
4.
Project Overview
Testing and refining the Provisional Assessment Criteria for collecting qualitative and
quantitative data about hospitals and communities throughout the U.S. for future hospital
preparedness evaluations.
5.
Evaluating the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of nine of the 11 demonstration grant
projects in the competitive Healthcare Facilities Partnership Program (HFPP) and developing
policy recommendations for the HFPP moving forward.
6.
Evaluating the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the five demonstration projects in the
Emergency Care Partnership Program (ECP) and developing policy recommendations for the
ECP moving forward.
Methodology
Overview
This Evaluation Report is based on the Center’s February 2008 Descriptive Framework, which was developed
for and approved by HHS. The Descriptive Framework is a conceptual model of local and regional hospital and
healthcare system preparedness for mass casualty events that outlines the essential elements of hospital disaster
preparedness. It is based on the Center’s comprehensive review and analysis of hospital disaster preparedness
documents, including reports, evaluations, handbooks, and studies that were produced before and after the 2002
establishment of the HPP.10
The project team selected preparedness topics from the Descriptive Framework to structure the Evaluation Report
research. Research for the report involved: (1) a comprehensive review of the literature on and history of U.S. hospital preparedness, FY2002-2008 HPP guidances, and HPP data; (2) in-depth conversations through the Working
Group with HHS staff and leadership and with hospital preparedness experts in every U.S. state, the District of Columbia, the nation’s three largest municipalities (Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York), Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands; and (3) an in-person discussion with Working Group participants during an Issue Analysis Meeting
convened in June 2008 by the Center.
Examples of key elements of hospital preparedness from the Descriptive Framework that were addressed in the
Working Group and Issue Analysis Meeting discussions include the organization and leadership of preparedness
efforts; progress in emergency drills, exercises, and training; situational awareness and communications capabilities; and allocation of scarce medical resources during catastrophic emergencies.
The formal time frame of analysis for the evaluation was limited to the first five HPP program years (FY2002
through FY2006) because many Working Group participants did not receive their FY2007 funding until after our
data collection began. However, because many participants had reviewed and may have begun to implement
activities from the FY2007 HPP guidance, their responses may also reflect FY2007 planning efforts.
10 See, e.g., Davis LM, Ringel JS, Cotton SK, et al. Public Health Preparedness: Integrating Public Health and Hospital
Preparedness Programs. RAND. 2006; Department of Veterans Affairs. Survey Assessment of VA Medical Centers’
Emergency Preparedness. Final Report. Booz Allen Hamilton. 2005; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Events: Questionnaire for Health Care
Facilities. Prepared by Booz Allen Hamilton: Contract No. HHSA29020050005C. April 2007; U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS). Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook. 2nd ed.
http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/discussion/planners/mscc/index.html. September 2007; U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. Top Officials 4 (TOPOFF 4) full-scale exercise (FSE) after action quick look report. DHS National Exercise Program.
November 19, 2007. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/media/2008/t4_after%20action_report.pdf.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
2
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Project Overview
Literature Review
To assess the impact of the HPP and to develop a baseline understanding of the state of hospital preparedness
prior to the program’s implementation in 2002, the project team used PubMed to conduct a comprehensive review of the published U.S. literature from 1995 through 2007 to identify studies that examined hospital preparedness before the establishment of the HPP. The team also conducted a thorough Internet search using the Google
search engine as a supplement to the research. Through our review, we identified 10 important surveys of hospital emergency preparedness conducted in the five years before and one year after September 11, 2001 (9/11).
While the literature review for this report focuses on hospital preparedness research conducted before HHS established the HPP in 2002, the project team collectively considered all of the materials identified in the development
of the Descriptive Framework (i.e., before and after the implementation of the HPP) to frame the report’s evaluation of hospital preparedness from FY2002 through FY2006. The team also reviewed HPP program guidance
issued since 2002 and mid- and end-of-year HPP participant data reported to HHS through 2006.11
Virtual Working Group
The project team then used the Descriptive Framework and findings from the literature review to develop a set
of discussion topics and questions for analyzing, through a Virtual Working Group (Working Group), the status
of hospital preparedness efforts and the major factors that have contributed to hospital preparedness progress.
The Working Group phase of the evaluation involved 91 in-depth telephone or in-person conversations with 133
individuals from all states, the District of Columbia, the nation’s three largest municipalities (Chicago, Los Angeles,
and New York), Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands who had firsthand experience with hospital preparedness
efforts (including but not limited to HPP experience).12 The entire group of participants did not meet together
at any one time. A minimum of two project team staff, including at least one senior team member, participated
in all conversations. Working Group participants contributed information on a not-for-attribution basis, and all
participants were informed that their call was being recorded solely to maintain accuracy for reference purposes.
The conversations occurred between January 2008 and August 2008, but the vast majority were held before the
June 2008 Issue Analysis Meeting.
The project team identified and recruited Working Group participants by contacting grant coordinators and HPP
leaders from each of the 62 jurisdictions participating in the HPP (Appendix C).13 Participants included: HPP grant
coordinators; state hospital preparedness coordinators; disaster coordinators from academic medical centers,
public hospitals, nonprofit community hospitals, for-profit hospitals, small independent hospitals, and hospitals
belonging to multi-hospital organizations; emergency medical services (EMS) representatives; healthcare preparedness experts; leaders in healthcare and public health; and leaders of key government preparedness and
evaluation efforts (Table 1). Hospital representatives were selected from various types and sizes of institutions in
an attempt to assess progress toward preparedness in the range of hospital systems, from rural to urban.
Using open-ended questions, project team members prompted Working Group participants to discuss selected
key areas of preparedness identified in the Descriptive Framework, such as: organization, exercises, situational
awareness, and surge capacity; the extent to which progress was achieved in those areas; and the extent to which
11 Of the 62 states, municipalities, and territories participating in the HPP, 58 (94%) provided 2006 end-of-year data to ASPR.
Of the 5,922 hospitals in those 58 jurisdictions, 5,155 (87%) were identified as HPP participants.
12 While the Northern Marianas, Guam, American Samoa, Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands also received HPP
funding, they are not included in this evaluation because the project team was unable to schedule conversations with their
HPP representatives.
13 According to the 2006 HPP data, 13% of U.S. hospitals did not participate in the HPP at the time; many of these hospitals
were small, critical access facilities located in rural areas.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
3
Project Overview
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
the HPP played a role in that progress. Conversations varied based on the participant’s position, the history and
organization of the HPP in each location, and the degree of progress in preparedness that had been achieved
before and during the program at each location.
All participants were asked whether their hospital, community, or state is better prepared now than it was in
2002 and, if so, in what ways. Participants were also asked to comment on how the HPP has contributed to that
change. At the end of each conversation, participants were given an opportunity to discuss the HPP’s strengths
and weaknesses and how they have changed over time, and they were invited to offer suggestions for the program moving forward.
Table 1. Number of Virtual Working Group Participants by Sector
Sector
Number of Participants
Department of Health—Municipality
6
Department of Health—State
31
Department of Health—Territory
2
EMS
3
Hospital
28
Hospital Association
4
Hospital Region
4
Hospital System
6
National Preparedness Leaders
Total
7
91
Issue Analysis Meeting
The Center invited 30 Working Group participants to participate in an Issue Analysis Group to discuss specific
hospital preparedness topics in more detail through a structured, in-person Issue Analysis Meeting, Issue Analysis:
Progress in Preparedness and Goals for the Future. The meeting was held on June 26, 2008, at the Center for
Biosecurity in Baltimore, Maryland. The 21 participants who attended were provided with the Descriptive Framework and other background materials to review in advance of the meeting. The meeting was facilitated by Center
leadership and senior members of the Center’s HPP project team on a not-for-attribution basis and recorded for
reference purposes only.
Meeting discussions were organized around the following five key findings from the Working Group conversations
to confirm the validity of the findings and allow for further comment:
1.
Real progress in individual hospital preparedness has been accomplished.
2.
Emerging Healthcare Coalitions are preparedness keystones.
3.
Situational awareness and communication tools are improving.
4.
More emphasis and rigor in drills and exercises has occurred.
5.
Mega-disaster planning is in its early stages.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
4
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
Project Overview
Participants were also asked to comment on the optimal ways to measure hospital disaster preparedness. That
topic will be addressed in greater detail as part of the Provisional Assessment Criteria component of the project,
which is a deliverable to be provided to HHS by the Center in 2009. Discussions on each of the meeting topics
ranged from approximately 30 to 60 minutes.
Analysis
After each conversation with Working Group participants, the project team compiled notes taken during the
discussions and, if needed, reviewed the recordings for verification. The Center identified key themes, novel
approaches, successes, and barriers from each conversation, and organized them into topic areas (e.g., hospital
leadership, situational awareness, and communications) derived from the Descriptive Framework.
Team members who participated in each call presented a synopsis of the notes to the full project team on a
weekly basis and identified comments to track as common themes (e.g., level of overall preparedness, funding,
successes, and challenges) or as innovative practices. The project team applied semi-quantitative frequency
distributions (i.e., few, some, most, or all) for the common responses, but catalogued novel responses by topic
areas that largely corresponded with categories of preparedness in the Descriptive Framework. Particularly creative, successful, or illustrative responses were explored in more detail by team members (e.g., through follow-up
phone conversations or by reviewing print or Internet materials) and are used in this report as examples or case
studies; the Center obtained permission from applicable Working Group participants to use these examples in the
report.
After the majority of discussions were completed, the project team further refined and analyzed the topic areas
and themes from the Working Group comments. Through that process, the team identified the five most
significant findings or areas that they believed were in greatest need of further exploration and Working Group
dialogue. These became the key topics for the June 2008 Issue Analysis Meeting. As with the individual Working Group discussions, the team reviewed, analyzed, and categorized the comments and themes that emerged
from the Issue Analysis Meeting. The key findings for the Evaluation Report were derived from both the Working
Group and Issue Analysis Meeting discussions. Because the meeting participants were a sub-group of the full
Working Group, the findings are referenced throughout this report as being from the Working Group participants.
They are described in detail in Section IV: Key Findings.
Limitations
Our methodology has several limitations. First, the key findings are based on qualitative data and on impressions of the Working Group participants, whose experience in hospital disaster preparedness varies. Second, the
Working Group was not comprised of a statistically representative sample of HPP participants. To understand
the experience with the HPP across the country, Working Group participants were selected by the project team
to maximize diversity of participants from hospitals, communities, and geographic areas. For these reasons, the
findings are likely not generalizable to every hospital throughout the U.S. A third limitation is that while all of the
discussions were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis, many of the participants were employed by healthcare
institutions receiving HPP funds or were in positions (e.g., state HPP coordinators) directly supported by HPP
funds. This might have introduced bias in responses due to perceived concern about loss of funding if responses
reflected challenges. Also, while our analysis focused on HPP activities from FY2002 through FY2006, our discussions occurred in 2008. Therefore, participants may have also reported on program and planning activities that
took place during FY2007, which was not part of the formal study period.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
5
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
II. State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the
Hospital Preparedness Program
To more thoroughly understand and evaluate the current state of hospital disaster preparedness in the U.S., we
first conducted research on the historical context that set the stage for the establishment of the HPP and on the
published literature of hospital preparedness prior to the program’s inception in 2002. This section provides an
overview of that history, summarizes the key themes from our review of the 10 studies that examined hospital
preparedness before and shortly after the terrorist events of 9/11, and highlights the critical gaps in hospital preparedness before the HPP was implemented.
Historical Context
Events and Threats Stimulating Hospital Preparedness
Disaster preparedness has traditionally focused on meeting the food, shelter, and economic needs of displaced
persons and on repairing the physical destruction of infrastructure and has not typically focused on healthcare
issues. Historically, some focus was directed to first aid and field triage, but little attention was given to other crucial activities, such as: strengthening the ability of hospitals to effectively provide care when there is a large, sudden surge in patient volume; working with local hospitals and response agencies to optimize patient care during
a disaster; and changing the delivery of patient care to ensure the best possible outcome for the greatest number
of patients. The lack of focus on hospitals was understandable, given that few disasters in modern U.S. history
involved very large numbers of seriously sick or injured individuals. The devastating experiences of the 1900
Galveston hurricane, 1906 San Francisco earthquake, and 1918 influenza pandemic were also largely forgotten.
The focus of hospital disaster planning was historically on protecting facilities and ensuring continuity of operations during natural disasters (e.g., floods and hurricanes). For example, before 2001, the emergency preparedness standards issued by the Joint Commission,14 an independent, not-for-profit organization responsible for accrediting and certifying more than 15,000 U.S. healthcare institutions and programs, focused primarily on physical
threats to the facility. These threats included fire, floods, and loss of utilities and were grouped with the security,
safety, and infection control standards rather than in an independent category.15,16 Hospital planning for multiple
casualties generally focused on the response of individual hospital emergency departments.
Just before and during the 1990s, critical events raised awareness of the increased need for hospital disaster
planning (Figure 1). While the threat of nuclear war abated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, concern
about the possibility of mass casualty terrorism on U.S. soil grew. The use of chemical weapons by Iraq against
the Iranians and Kurds in the 1980s and the 1995 use of sarin gas by Aum Shinrikyo as a terrorist weapon in Tokyo
raised the specter of chemical weapons use against civilians. Revelations in the early 1990s about the massive,
secret Soviet bioweapons program and the uncovering of Iraq’s biological weapons program after the first Gulf
14 The original name of the Joint Commission is the “Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals” (JCAH). In 1987,
the organization changed its name to the “Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations” (JCAHO)
to reflect an expanded scope of activities; this was later abbreviated to the “Joint Commission” (JC). The Joint
Commission. A Journey through the History of the Joint Commission. Updated March 2008.
http://www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/joint_commission_history.htm. Accessed September 8, 2008.
15 Joint Commission accreditation and certification is recognized nationwide as a symbol of quality that reflects an
organization’s commitment to meeting certain performance standards. Hospitals pay close attention to the standards
because accreditation by the organization enables hospitals to participate in the Medicare program, which is essential to
their financial viability. To be accredited, hospitals must pass periodic site visits that assess adherence to JC standards,
which address nearly every aspect of hospital operations.
16 See, e.g., Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 1998 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals: Section 2, Management of the Environment of Care. Oakbrook Terrace (IL): JCAHO; 1998.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
7
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
War convinced many that these types of weapons were more readily available than previously thought. In addition, “loose” nuclear materials became an increased concern, and the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism
emerged as a possibility.
In 1993, Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center with a truck bomb that killed six and injured more than 1,000
individuals. Two years later, the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City killed 168 and
injured more than 800 people, although fewer than 100 were hospitalized overnight. Other natural disasters, such
as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes in California, reinforced
the critical role of hospitals during catastrophic emergencies.
However, the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks of the same
year provided the most significant examples of the threat of mass casualty terrorism in the U.S. and highlighted
the importance of healthcare system preparedness. On 9/11, hospitals in New York City initiated their disaster
response plans, but found that their previous disaster drills did not adequately prepare staff for the magnitude of
the event.17 After the attack at the Pentagon, hospitals in the Washington, DC, area also responded by activating
their respective disaster plans to prepare for potential victims. But the plans were insufficient, as hospitals encountered challenges with communication, patient tracking, data management, staff support, personnel identification, and overcrowding.18
In October 2001, envelopes filled with Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that causes anthrax, were mailed to
media outlets and U.S. Senate offices. Twenty-two illnesses, including five deaths, resulted from these attacks,
but thousands of individuals were advised to take antibiotics, and emergency response personnel were asked to
investigate countless incidents of “suspicious powder.” Few physicians at the time were familiar with the clinical
manifestations, treatment, and prophylaxis of the disease,19 and the anthrax experience revealed a level of fragility
in public health and hospital preparedness. Moreover, the ability to respond effectively to public health emergencies was recognized as a vital component of national security.20
Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs
In the 1990s and in response to 9/11, the federal government developed and strengthened several programs
aimed at improving the country’s medical and public health response to disasters (Figure 1). For example, it
strengthened the deployable assets of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a federally coordinated
system to temporarily supplement federal, tribal, state, and local medical and public health capabilities by providing personnel, supplies and equipment, patient transport, and definitive medical care.21 This included increasing
the number of NDMS Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), which are self-sufficient groups of healthcare
professionals and support personnel who are capable of working in austere environments and who can quickly be
deployed to a disaster scene to provide short-term medical care to victims.22
Addressing the increasing concern about terrorism, the federal government created the Metropolitan Medical
Response System (MMRS) in 1996 to “further enhance and sustain a comprehensive regional mass casualty
Feeney JM, Goldberg R, Blumenthal JA, et al. September 11, 2001, revisited: a review of the data. Arch Surg 2005;140:1068-1073.
Wang D, Sava J, Sample G, et al. The Pentagon and 9/11. Crit Care Med 2005;33(1):S42-S47.
Quintiliani R Jr, Quintiliani R. Inhalational anthrax and bioterrorism. Curr Opin Pulm Med 2003;9:221-22.
Gursky E, Inglesby TV, O’Toole T. Anthrax 2001: observations on the medical and public health response. Biosecur Bioterror
2003;1(2):97-110.
21 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).
http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/ndms/index.html.
22 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams (DMAT). http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/ndms/teams/dmat.html.
17
18
19
20
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
8
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
incident response capability during the first crucial hours of an incident.”23,24 MMRS is intended to prepare 124
highly populated jurisdictions for responding to all-hazards mass casualty incidents, such as terrorism, natural
disasters, and large-scale hazardous materials incidents.25 While cities and states had the authority to use MMRS
program funding to improve hospital preparedness, few did.
Figure 1. Timeline of Significant Events for Healthcare Preparedness: 1989–2007
1992
Disclosure of Soviet
Bioweapons Program
1993
World Trade
Center
Bombing
1989
Loma Prieta
Earthquake
1991
Gulf War;
Discovery of Iraq’s Biological
Weapons Program
1994
2001
9/11;
Anthrax Letters
1995
Aum Shinrikyo
Sarin Attack (Japan)
2003
SARS
1995
Oklahoma City
Bombing
2005
Hurricane Katrina
2001
JC Upgrades
Emergency
Management
Standards
Northridge
Earthquake
2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami
2007
1989
1996
MMRS Created
1999
National
Pharmaceutical
Stockpile
Established
1997
CDC “Emergency-Ready”
Public Health Department
Funding
2004
CRI
Established
2003
NPS Became SNS
2002
P.L. No. 107-188;
CDC PHEP Funding Established
2006
PAHPA
2007
ASPR Created;
HPP Moved to ASPR
2002
NBHPP Created
The events of 2001 also highlighted the significant role that the nation’s public health system plays during
catastrophic emergencies, as well as the system’s weaknesses in responding to crises. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) began providing public health preparedness funds to state and local health departments in 1997,26 but this funding significantly increased after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks.27 In FY2002, CDC
granted $918 million to states, territories, and four large cities for all-hazards preparedness activities through
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FY 2008 Overview: Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), State Homeland Security Program Tribal (SHSP Tribal), Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP), Operation Stonegarden (OPSG), Regional Catastrophic
Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP). July 25, 2008. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grant-program-overview-fy2008.pdf.
24 MMRS is currently part of DHS’s Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), which also includes the: State Homeland Security Program
(SHSP) to enhance state and local capabilities through planning, equipment, training, and exercises and implement goals and objectives included in state homeland security strategies and initiatives in the State Preparedness Report; Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) to build capabilities in 60 high-threat, high-density urban areas; and Citizen Corps Program (CCP) to engage citizens in
personal preparedness, exercises, ongoing volunteer programs, and surge capacity response.
25 DHS (2008).
26 National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). Federal Funding for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness: Implications and Ongoing Issues for Local Health Departments. August 2007.
27 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State by State. February 2008.
http://emergency.cdc.gov/publications/feb08phprep/pdf/feb08phprep.pdf.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
9
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement.28 Under the program, funding
has been provided to help develop the capacity and capability of public health departments to be “emergencyready” for a variety of hazards, such as pandemic influenza and anthrax.29,30
Prior to 9/11, CDC had also established programs to improve the nation’s electronic communications and biosurveillance systems. For example, the Health Alert Network (HAN) was created as a nationwide program to ensure that every community has rapid and timely access to emergent health information, a cadre of highly trained
professional personnel, and evidence-based practices and procedures for effective public health preparedness,
response, and service on a 24/7 basis.31 While HAN was established in 1998, the system was only fully activated
for the second time since its inception on 9/11.32,33,34 Surveillance programs implemented by CDC prior to 9/11
include the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) to maintain a network of laboratories that can respond to biological and chemical terrorism and other public health emergencies,35 the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) to
enable CDC officials, state and local health departments, poison control centers, and other public health professionals to quickly access and share preliminary health surveillance information,36 and the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS) to detect outbreaks rapidly, monitor the health of the nation, and facilitate the
electronic transfer of appropriate information from clinical information systems in the healthcare system to public
health departments.37 All of these public health programs and funding initiatives have had a beneficial effect on
hospital preparedness and situational awareness and, in many jurisdictions, have been conducted in coordination
with hospitals.
While these federal programs have had a medical or public health focus, their impact on hospital preparedness is
unclear. By enhancing the capabilities of first responders and augmenting emergency medical response, certain
programs (e.g., NDMS and MMRS) likely supplemented the ability of many hospitals to care for patients during
disasters. Improvements in public health surveillance and preparedness also may have contributed to hospital
preparedness in some locations. However, it was not until the 2001 terrorist attacks that the need became clear
for healthcare organizations to be prepared to respond to mass casualty events and that existing programs were
insufficient to support achieving the necessary level of hospital preparedness. Therefore, the HPP was established
in spring 2002 as the first federal program to focus primarily on strengthening the capacity of hospitals to prepare
for and respond to disasters. The program will be discussed in detail in Section III: History of the Hospital
Preparedness Program.
28 NACCHO (2007).
29 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness.
http://emergency.cdc.gov/cotper/coopagreement/#07.
30 For example, the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) program was established in FY2004 as part of the PHEP program and
designed to enhance the ability of 72 CRI cities and metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) to rapidly dispense medical
countermeasures from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)—formerly the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS)—to
an entire population within 48 hours of a decision to do so after an anthrax attack. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Key Facts about the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI). April 2, 2008. http://emergency.cdc.gov/cri/facts.asp.
31 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Health Alert Network. 2002. http://www2a.cdc.gov/han/index.asp.
32 O’Carroll W, Halverson P, Jones DL, Baker EL. The Health Alert Network in action. Northwest Public Health 2002;
Spring/Summer:14-15.
33 Baker EL, Porter J. The Health Alert Network: partnerships, politics, and preparedness. J Public Health Manag
Pract 2005;11(6):574-576.
34 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Assistant Secretary for Legislation. Testimony of Edward L. Baker.
Bioterrorism preparedness: CDC efforts to improve public health information at federal, state, and local levels.
December 14, 2001. http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t011214.html.
35 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Facts about the Laboratory Response Network.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/factsheet.asp.
36 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Epi-X: the Epidemic Information Exchange. http://www.cdc.gov/epix/.
37 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Electronic Disease Surveillance System.
http://www.cdc.gov/NEDSS/.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
10
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
Pre-HPP Hospital Preparedness Research
Summary
To assess the impact of the HPP and develop a baseline understanding of the state of hospital preparedness prior
to the program’s implementation in 2002, we conducted a comprehensive review of the published literature from
1995 through 2007 to identify studies that examined hospital preparedness before the establishment of the HPP.
While we were unable to identify any comprehensive national studies of U.S. healthcare preparedness prior to the
HPP, we did identify 10 important surveys of hospital emergency preparedness conducted in the five years before
and one year after 9/11 (Table 2).
While each of these 10 studies examined different aspects of preparedness in various geographic areas,
collectively they provide a picture of hospital preparedness prior to 2002.38 Overall, hospital preparedness was
in the early stages before 9/11. Shortly after the terrorist events of 2001, hospitals significantly increased their
preparedness efforts, but these activities focused more on planning than on conducting exercises, drills, and
training or on stockpiling necessary equipment and supplies. Despite advances in planning, gaps in preparedness, as defined by our Descriptive Framework, remained in the period immediately before the HPP was
implemented in 2002. Following is a summary of these key themes.
Key Themes from the 10 Studies
Hospital preparedness was in the early stages before 9/11.
Of the 10 studies of hospital emergency preparedness that we identified, seven were conducted before 9/11 (i.e.,
between 1995 and mid-2001).39,40� Early research focused on the threats of chemical and hazardous materials
(HAZMAT) because the threat of bioterrorism was not yet widely recognized. Studies conducted between 1998
and 2001 expanded the focus by including bioterrorism and, in some cases, radiological and nuclear threats. In
these later studies, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) referred to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
We also identified four surveys of hospital emergency preparedness that were conducted within one year of
9/11.41,42� Although the HPP was initiated in early 2002, most hospitals did not receive their first funding awards
until late 2002, so it is reasonable to conclude that surveys conducted before September 2002 reflect pre-HPP
activities.
It should also be noted that, prior to 2001, the emergency preparedness standards of the Joint Commission,
which has a strong influence on hospital operations, were primarily focused on physical threats to hospital
facilities (e.g., bomb threats, floods, and loss of utilities).43
38 However, these studies do not address the quality (e.g., depth and breadth) of planning and training, rigor of exercises
and degree to which lessons learned from exercises were incorporated into plan improvement, or the extent of hospital
involvement in collaborative planning and response with others in the local community.
39 Cone DC, Davidson SJ (1997); Burgess JL, Blackmon GM, Brodkin CA, Robertson WO (1997); Wetter DC, Daniell WE,
Treser CD (2001); Greenberg MI, Jurgens SM, Gracely EJ (2002); Treat KN, Williams JM, Furbee PM, et al. (2001);
Davis LM, Blanchard JC (2002); Braun BI, Darcy L, Divi C, et al. (2004).
40 The Braun et al. (2004) study was conducted in two stages: pre-9/11 (spring 2001) and post-9/11 (spring 2002).
41 Braun BI, Darcy L, Divi C, et al. (2004); Higgins W, Wainright C, Lu N, Carrico T (2004); U.S. General Accounting
Office (2003); Niska RW, Burt CW (2003).
42 The Braun et al. (2004) study was conducted in two stages: pre-9/11 (spring 2001) and post-9/11 (spring 2002).
43 See, e.g., Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 1998 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual
for Hospitals (1998).
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
11
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
Table 2. Studies on Pre-HPP Hospital Preparedness by Year
Year
Reference
Description
1995
Cone DC, Davidson SJ. Hazardous materials
preparedness in the emergency department. Prehosp Emerg Care 1997;1(2):8590.
Survey of 38 hospitals in the five-county Philadelphia
metropolitan area to examine emergency department
(ED) preparedness to safely receive, decontaminate, and
treat chemically contaminated patients.
1996
Burgess JL, Blackmon GM, Brodkin CA,
Robertson WO. Hospital preparedness for
hazardous materials incidents and treatment
of contaminated patients. West J Med
1997;167(6):387-391.
Survey of 95 hospital-based facilities providing emergency care in the state of Washington to determine their
levels of preparedness for hazardous materials incidents,
including the treatment of contaminated patients.
1998
Wetter DC, Daniell WE, Treser CD. Hospital
preparedness for victims of chemical or
biological terrorism. Am J Public Health
2001;91(5):710-716.
Survey of 186 hospital EDs in four northwestern states
(AK, ID, OR, WA) examining hospital preparedness for
chemical or biological weapons incidents by reviewing
administrative plans, training, physical resources, and
representative medication inventories.
2000
Greenberg MI, Jurgens SM, Gracely EJ.
Emergency department preparedness for
the evaluation and treatment of victims of
biological or chemical terrorist attack. J
Emerg Med 2002;22(3):273-278.
Survey of preparedness among 54 EDs in the greater
Philadelphia area to evaluate and treat victims of a terrorist biological or chemical agent release.
2000
Treat KN, Williams JM, Furbee PM, et al.
Hospital preparedness for weapons of mass
destruction incidents: an initial assessment.
Ann Emerg Med 2001;38(5):562-565.
Assessment of hospital preparedness for weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) incidents among 22 rural and
eight urban hospitals in FEMA Region III (DC, MD, PA,
VA, WV) by examining level of preparedness, mass decontamination capabilities, training of hospital staff, and
facility security capabilities.
2001
Davis LM, Blanchard JC. Are Local Health
Responders Ready for Biological and
Chemical Terrorism? Santa Monica, CA:
RAND. 2002.
Nationwide survey of 147 local public health departments and 105 general acute care hospitals (public and
private) on their emergency response preparedness in
general and specifically for WMD incidents, including
bioterrorism.
2001-2002
Braun BI, Darcy L, Divi C, et al. Hospital
bioterrorism preparedness linkages with the
community: improvements over time. Am J
Infect Control 2004;32(6):317-326.
Joint Commission pilot study assessing changes in
linkages between hospitals and key community entities
related to preparedness for a bioterrorism event before
(April-May 2001; 68 hospitals) and after (May-June 2002;
97 hospitals) the events of 9/11.
2002-2003
Higgins W, Wainright C, Lu N, Carrico T.
Assessing hospital preparedness using an
instrument based on the Mass Casualty Disaster Plan Checklist: results of a statewide
survey. Am J Infect Control 2004;32(6):327332.
Survey based on the Mass Casualty Disaster Plan
Checklist and a supplemental bioterrorism preparedness questionnaire (based on an AHRQ checklist) of 116
short-term and long-term hospitals in Kentucky to assess
preparedness for mass casualty events.
2002
U.S. General Accounting Office. Hospital
Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have
Emergency Plans but Lack Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response. GAO-03924. 2003.
Survey of 1,482 urban hospitals with EDs across the U.S.
on emergency preparedness, including hospital preparedness for bioterrorism (e.g., data on planning activities, staff training, and capacity for response).
2003
Niska RW, Burt CW. Bioterrorism and mass
casualty preparedness in hospitals: US, 2003
(No. 364). U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. Advance Data from Vital
and Health Statistics. September 2005.
Survey of 399 hospitals in a supplement of the National
Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (an annual survey of approximately 500 non-federal general and shortstay hospitals) to examine: terrorism preparedness/response plan content; whether plans were updated since
9/11; collaboration with outside organizations; training
in managing biological, chemical, explosive, and nuclear
exposures; drills; and equipment and bed capacity.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
12
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
The one study that addressed the basic elements of hospital emergency preparedness at the time, such as general disaster planning, security, drills, and communcations, suggests that many, if not most, hospitals probably met
those standards.44 In January 2001, the Joint Commission significantly broadened the scope of the emergency
preparedness standards to emergency management.45 For example, the revised standards included requirements
for coordinated planning and exercising with local community response agencies, implementation of the incident command system and a hazard/vulnerability assessment (HVA), and planning for four phases of emergency
management (i.e., mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery).46 The extent to which these new standards
improved hospital preparedness before 9/11 is unclear because they had not yet been widely adopted, but they
may have had some positive effect on readiness.
The seven pre-9/11 studies of hospital preparedness collectively show that the level of preparedness among individual hospitals varied throughout the U.S. before 9/11, but was generally in the early stages. Little hospital planning for WMD incidents and other large-scale events occurred, and much of the planning that had taken place
focused on chemical incidents. Some hospitals conducted WMD drills and exercises, but few provided WMD
education and training to their staff, conducted WMD drills and exercises, or had the capacity for decontamination. In addition, formal inter-hospital and community collaboration on disaster preparedness was uncommon
during this time.
WMD planning. Relatively few hospitals incorporated WMD incidents into their emergency planning activities
before 9/11, and those that did tended to be in larger urban areas and focused on decontamination after chemical exposures. While a 1995 study of 38 Philadelphia-area hospitals found that 63% of the hospitals had a written
plan for decontamination and treatment of chemically contaminated patients in the emergency department,47 a
later study of 30 rural and urban hospitals in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region III�48 found
that only 27% of the facilities had incorporated WMD preparedness into their disaster plans.49 In a 1998 study of
hospital preparedness for chemical and biological terrorism conducted among 186 hospital emergency departments in four northwestern states, fewer than 20% had plans for responding to chemical or biological terrorism.50
Preparedness for bioterrorism incidents was not as commonly included in hospital disaster plans as was preparedness for chemical incidents. Just prior to 9/11, the RAND Corporation conducted a WMD preparedness study of
one acute-care hospital and the public health departments in each of 200 randomly selected counties throughout
the U.S.51 While 54% of the 105 general acute care hospitals reported having written plans for chemical incidents,
only 32% had written plans for biological incidents.52 In addition, a Joint Commission study on bioterrorism
preparedness of 68 hospitals across the country in April and May 2001 found that only 47% had a hospital plan
that addressed bioterrorism.53 Preparedness for epidemics and pandemics was not typically addressed in hospital
disaster plans before 9/11.
44 Treat KN, Williams JM, Furbee PM, et al. Hospital preparedness for weapons of mass destruction incidents: an initial
assessment. Ann Emerg Med 2001;38(5):562-565. This study of 30 primarily rural hospitals in West Virginia and the
western regions of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia in 2000 found that all of the responding facilities reported having
dedicated telephone lines and radios for use during a disaster and had staff call-in systems that used either a telephone
call list or a paging system. In addition, 77% reported having a security plan, with one-half stating that they were able to
perform a hospital-wide lockdown without outside assistance.
45 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). 2001 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals: Management of the Environment of Care Standard, E.C. 1.4. Oakbrook Terrace (IL): JCAHO; 2001.
46 JCAHO (2001).
47 Cone DC, Davidson SJ. Hazardous materials preparedness in the emergency department. Prehosp Emerg Care 1997;1(2):85-90.
48 District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.
49 Treat KN, Williams JM, Furbee PM, et al. Hospital preparedness for weapons of mass destruction incidents: an initial assessment.
Ann Emerg Med 2001;38(5):562-565.
50 Wetter DC, Daniell WE, Treser CD. Hospital preparedness for victims of chemical or biological terrorism. Am J Public Health
2001;91(5):710-716.
51 Davis LM, Blanchard JC. Are Local Health Responders Ready for Biological and Chemical Terrorism? Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 2002.
52 Ibid.
53 Braun BI, Darcy L, Divi C, et al. Hospital bioterrorism preparedness linkages with the community: improvements
over time. Am J Infect Control 2004;32(6):317-326.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
13
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
WMD exercises, training, and education. The research also shows that hospital WMD exercises and drills,
training, and education were not widespread before 9/11. For example, the 1995 Philadelphia-area study found
that only 34% of the 38 hospitals surveyed had conducted a drill of their plans for decontaminating and treating
chemically contaminated patients in the previous year.54 The study of 186 hospital emergency departments in
four northwestern states in 1998 found that only about 20% of the hospitals had offered any training for staff on
incidents involving biological or chemical weapons.55 In 2000, the survey of 30 hospitals in FEMA Region III found
that less than 25% had provided any education to staff or had conducted any drills related to WMD,56 and a study
of preparedness among 54 emergency departments in the Philadelphia area found that 61% of the hospitals had
conducted a drill involving chemical or biological agents within the previous three years.57 However, in 2001, the
Joint Commission found that only 19% of the 68 hospitals studied had conducted a drill involving a bioterrorism scenario,58 and the RAND Corporation study found the same year that only one out of 10 hospitals with a
response plan for a biological incident had exercised their response plans within the past year.59
Decontamination capacity. In addition, the studies of hospital preparedness found that hospitals had limited
capacity to decontaminate patients before 9/11. For example, only 53% of the 38 hospitals with emergency
departments surveyed in the Philadelphia area in 1995 had a specific treatment area for chemically contaminated
patients, and only 34% had any type of respiratory protection available for emergency department staff.60 In a
1996 study of 95 hospitals providing emergency care in the state of Washington, only 44% of facilities reported
having the ability to receive chemically exposed patients, and 41% had no designated decontamination facilities.61 In addition, the 1998 survey of 186 northwestern hospitals found that while 45% had a decontamination
unit, less than one-quarter of the hospitals had the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) for chemical decontamination.62 By 2000, the situation appeared to have improved moderately. The 2000 assessment of
hospital preparedness in FEMA Region III found that most of the 30 hospitals surveyed reported having some
decontamination capability.63 However, 73% of the hospitals indicated that this would involve setting up a single
decontamination room to handle one victim at a time.64 Also in 2000, the survey of Philadelphia-area emergency
department preparedness found that 90% of the 54 respondent hospitals reported having some decontamination
capacity, but only 7% reported having the ability to decontaminate more than 10 patients per hour.65
Collaboration with other healthcare organizations. Before the events of 9/11, formal collaboration between
and among hospitals and the community was not widespread. For example, in 2000, the Philadelphia-area emergency department preparedness study found that only 18% of hospitals had mutual aid agreements with neighboring hospitals,66 and the FEMA Region III research found that none of the 30 facilities in the study had specific
agreements in place for managing large-scale mass casualties that required patient overflow to other facilities.67
In 2001, the RAND Corporation study found that 85% of the 105 general acute care hospitals surveyed had
informal or formal mutual aid agreements with organizations for disaster and emergency response in general, but
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
Cone DC, Davidson SJ (1997).
Wetter DC, Daniell WE, Treser CD (2001).
Treat KN, Williams JM, Furbee PM, et al. (2001).
Greenberg MI, Jurgens SM, Gracely EJ. Emergency department preparedness for the evaluation and treatment of victims
of biological or chemical terrorist attack. J Emerg Med 2002;22(3):273-278.
Braun BI, Darcy L, Divi C, et al. Hospital bioterrorism preparedness linkages with the community: improvements over time.
Am J Infect Control 2004;32(6):317-326.
Davis LM, Blanchard JC (2002).
Cone DC, Davidson SJ (1997).
Burgess JL, Blackmon GM, Brodkin CA, Robertson WO. Hospital preparedness for hazardous materials incidents and
treatment of contaminated patients. West J Med 1997;167(6):387-391.
Wetter DC, Daniell WE, Treser CD (2001).
Treat KN, Williams JM, Furbee PM, et al. (2001).
Ibid.
Greenberg MI, Jurgens SM, Gracely EJ (2002).
Ibid.
Treat KN, Williams JM, Furbee PM, et al. (2001).
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
14
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
only 12% had such agreements that specifically addressed WMD-related incidents.68 Furthermore, the April-May
2001 Joint Commission study found that only 29% of the hospitals studied had participated in the development
of community emergency management plans, and only 38% of the hospitals had developed their bioterrorism
plans in collaboration and coordination with other entities.69
Between 9/11 and early 2002, hospital preparedness activity significantly increased and largely focused on
planning.
Immediately after 9/11, hospital efforts to prepare for disaster response substantially increased. Most of these
activities focused on hospital planning and began to more comprehensively address WMD events. At the same
time, and coinciding with the January 2001 revision and broadened scope of the Joint Commission emergency
preparedness standards,70, 71 many hospitals began to plan and conduct exercises in collaboration with other
healthcare organizations in the community. Large-scale purchasing of emergency equipment and supplies (e.g.,
PPE) and training (e.g., on decontamination procedures) did not appear to have been undertaken until after the
start of the HPP in 2002. Hospitals also began to recognize the need for additional funding during this time.
An example of the significant improvement in hospital preparedness elements is found in the follow-up to the
April-May 2001 Joint Commission study, which was conducted among 97 hospitals in May-June 2002 (i.e., before
hospitals received HPP funds).72 The most progress was made in planning during the first few months after 9/11.
For example, the study found an 82% relative increase in the percentage of hospitals that had a bioterrorism plan
(47% vs. 91%), a 70% increase in the percentage of hospitals that had developed their bioterrorism plan in
collaboration with other entities (38% vs. 81%), and a 58% increase in the percentage of hospitals that had participated in the development of community emergency management plans (29% vs. 70%).73 The study also found
relative improvements in the occurrence of bioterrorism training and drills. Researchers reported a 51% increase
in the percentage of hospitals that had participated in community bioterrorism training (21% vs. 61%) and a 36%
increase in the percentage of hospitals that had conducted a bioterrorism drill (19% vs. 48%).74 In this study,
preparedness elements related to equipment and information sharing showed much less improvement.75
A 2002 study of hospital emergency preparedness among 116 hospitals in Kentucky found similar results.76 As in
the Joint Commission study, most of the improvements in preparedness pertained to planning, with 81% of the
hospitals reporting that they had revised their disaster plans after 9/11.77 In addition, a bioterrorism preparedness
survey of 1,482 urban hospitals conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, or GAO) between May and September 2002 found that 81% of the hospitals had
bioterrorism plans, most had participated in community planning to some degree, and most had conducted some
training on biological agents.78 Fewer than half had conducted bioterrorism drills, however, and few hospitals had
purchased medical equipment to care for a large surge of patients.79
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
Davis LM, Blanchard JC (2002).
Braun BI, Darcy L, Divi C, et al. (2004).
JCAHO (2001).
While much of the improvement that was found in the research was likely spurred by the perceived threat of terrorism, it should also
be noted that the Joint Commission revised its emergency preparedness standards in January 2001 to require collaborative planning
with other healthcare organizations in the community.
Braun BI, Darcy L, Divi C, et al. (2004).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Higgins W, Wainright C, Lu N, Carrico T. Assessing hospital preparedness using an instrument based on the Mass Casualty Disaster
Plan Checklist: results of a statewide survey. Am J Infect Control 2004;32(6):327-332.
Higgins W, Wainright C, Lu N, Carrico T (2004).
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans but Lack Certain
Capacities for Bioterrorism Response. GAO-03-924. August 2003.
GAO (2003).
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
15
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
Furthermore, in line with the findings of the previous studies, a 2003 study examining bioterrorism and emergency preparedness of 399 U.S. hospitals found that the vast majority (97%) of hospitals had developed emergency
response plans for natural disasters.80 While 77% to 85% of the hospitals also had plans for chemical, biological,
nuclear/radiologic, or explosive/incendiary incidents, only 63% had plans for natural disasters and all of these
incidents.�81 Three-quarters of the hospitals had engaged in some degree of communitywide planning, but less
than one-half had a formal memorandum of understanding (MOU) with other local healthcare facilities.82 Only
66% of hospitals studied had been involved in any disaster drill involving external organizations, and only a small
minority had conducted a drill involving a WMD, explosives, or a severe epidemic.83 Of those involved in external
drills, more than one-half of the drills included EMS, police, or fire, but less than one-half included public health,
the American Red Cross, or medical suppliers.84 The survey did not assess the quality of the plans or address
when they were written.
As planning efforts increased after 9/11, hospitals began to recognize the need for additional funding to
support such efforts. For example, the 2002 study of hospital preparedness in Kentucky found that the 116 hospitals participating in the survey reported having collectively spent $1.7 million (an average of $15,000 per hospital)
to increase preparedness in the previous 10 months, but estimated needing $18.5 million ($160,000 per hospital)
in additional funds, primarily for training and equipment.85
Despite progress in planning, significant hospital preparedness gaps remained after 9/11.
As a whole, the post-9/11 studies indicate that even though significant advances in hospital planning had
occurred, by 2002 much work still remained for hospitals to improve their disaster readiness. While the studies
conducted prior to 9/11 showed a gradual tendency toward more WMD awareness and planning over time, the
level of planning greatly increased—particularly with respect to WMD response—immediately after the 2001
terrorist attacks. To a lesser extent, activity increased in the areas of training for hospital staff to respond to WMD
events, drilling and exercising plans, and collaborating with community partners, such as emergency response
agencies and competing healthcare entities. The least amount of progress seems to have been made in the
purchasing of equipment needed to increase surge capacity, decontaminate patients, and protect staff. These
findings make sense because developing plans is generally an early step in preparedness efforts and may be less
time-intensive or less expensive86� than some of the other activities, such as collaborating with community partners, developing and conducting exercises, and purchasing equipment.
However, by early 2002, gaps remained in each of the key areas of preparedness. Although not addressed in the
10 preparedness studies, our analytic work for the Descriptive Framework and our previous research on hospital preparedness suggest that gaps also remained in the areas of leadership and coordination at all levels (i.e.,
individual hospital, local, regional, state, and federal), situational awareness at all levels, incident management,
hospital and community-based surge capacity, and infectious disease isolation capacity.
In addition to the lack of generalizability of the research, the 10 studies have some important limitations. For example, because little guidance on hospital disaster preparedness existed at the time, the quality and consistency
of the planning that was reported to have occurred was not addressed. Also, it is difficult to assess the degree
of collaboration reported in these studies, particularly because close cooperation between hospitals, especially
those that were competitors, and local and state agencies did not typically occur before 2002.
80 The survey was fielded before HPP funds had been fully awarded to hospitals. Niska RW, Burt CW. Bioterrorism and mass casualty
preparedness in hospitals: US, 2003 (No. 364). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Advance Data from Vital and Health
Statistics. September 2005.
81 Niska RW, Burt CW (2005).
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Higgins W, Wainright C, Lu N, Carrico T (2004).
86 Lack of funding appeared to be one of the major barriers for further preparedness. See, e.g., Ibid.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
16
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
State of U.S. Hospital Preparedness Prior to the HPP
III. History of the Hospital Preparedness Program
Legislative and Funding History
Legislation
In response to the events of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, President Bush signed into law in January 2002 the
Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,87 which appropriated $2.9 billion in funding to HHS for bioterrorism preparedness.88 The legislation specifically authorized $135 million in funding through the Public Health and
Social Services Emergency Fund to improve the capacity of hospitals to respond to bioterrorism.89
On February 15, 2002, HRSA issued the first guidance for the NBHPP and announced that $125 million of the
funds would be made available to hospitals through state, territorial, and selected municipal offices of public health in the form of cooperative agreements for FY2002.90 State public health departments were used as
conduits for these funds because HHS had no point of connection to hospitals other than through the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Creating individual cooperative agreements with approximately 5,000 hospitals was
inconceivable.
The original purpose of the NBHPP was:
“to upgrade the preparedness of the Nation’s hospitals and collaborating entities to respond to
bioterrorism. This will also allow the health care system to become more prepared to deal with
nonterrorist epidemics of rare diseases. The prime focus will be on identification and
implementation of bioterrorism preparedness plans and protocols for hospitals and other
participating health care entities. Development of statewide or regional models for such protocols
is encouraged, as is collaboration with other States and expert national organizations.” 91
In June 2002, Congress authorized a continuing response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies
by passing the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law No.
107-188) to improve the ability of the U.S. to prevent, prepare for, and respond to these events.92 Among other
things, the legislation amended the Public Health Service Act by requiring the HHS Secretary to make available
awards of cooperative agreements or grants to improve hospital preparedness for and response to bioterrorism
and other public health emergencies; this included awards for partnerships for hospital preparedness. Funding
was provided under the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (Public Law No. 108-7).93
87 Public Law No. 107-117. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002. January 10, 2002.
88 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Bioterror funding provides blueprint to build a strong new public health infrastructure
[news release]. January 25, 2002. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020125.html. Accessed September 8, 2008.
89 Public Law No. 107-117. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002. January 10, 2002.
90 Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Bioterrorism Hospital
Preparedness Program, Cooperative Agreement Guidance. Washington, DC. 2002.
91 Ibid.
92 Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. National Bioterrorism Hospital
Preparedness Program, Cooperative Agreement Guidance. Washington, DC. 2003.
93 Ibid.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
17
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
History of the HPP
In concert with the DHS National Preparedness Goal,94 the aim of the NBHPP was broadened in FY2005 and
FY2006 to include all-hazards preparedness. In addition, the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
(PAHPA) (Public Law No. 109-417) had broad implications for a range of disaster preparedness and response
activities in addition to hospital preparedness. For example, PAHPA established the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) within HHS and shifted the cooperative agreement program for hospital preparedness from HRSA to ASPR. The legislation also amended section 319C-2 of the Public Health Service Act by
authorizing the Secretary of HHS to directly award competitive grants to eligible Healthcare Facilities Partnerships
to improve surge capacity and to enhance community and hospital preparedness for public health emergencies,
in addition to continuing to authorize the HPP formula grants to states, territories, and the nation’s three largest
municipalities. Funding for the awards was provided by the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007
(Public Law No. 110-5).
As noted earlier, the original name of the hospital program was the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness
Program, or NBHPP. In FY2007, the name was shortened to the Hospital Preparedness Program, or HPP. Recently, the HPP was renamed as the National Healthcare Preparedness Program (NHPP). The program is currently
based in ASPR’s Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations (OPEO).
Funding Awards
As mentioned, the FY2002 NBHPP grants totaled approximately $135 million; HHS made $125 million of this
amount available in FY2002 to hospitals through cooperative agreements with awardees, which included state,
municipal, and territorial health departments. From FY2002 to FY2007, the federal government provided a total
of approximately $2.6 billion in HPP funds (Table 3).
Sixty-two entities, including the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the nation’s three largest municipalities (Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City), the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands,
three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau,
have received hospital preparedness funding as awardees (Figure 2). The funding that these individual awardees
have received for each fiscal year is the sum of a fixed base amount and a variable amount that is proportional
to each awardee’s population. In addition, the awardees have determined which hospitals to fund, how many to
fund, and the level of funding to provide to each hospital.
Table 3. Hospital Preparedness Program Funding: FY2002–FY200995
Fiscal Year
Funding (millions)
2002
$135
2003
$515
2004
$515
2005
$487
2006
$474
2007
$474
2008 (estimate)
$423
2009 (budget)
$362
Total
$3,385
94 The goal guides entities at all levels of government in the development and maintenance of capabilities to prevent, protect against,
respond to, and recover from major events, including Incidents of National Significance. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. The Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP).
http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/hpp/.
95 Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Announcement of Availability of Funds for the Hospital Preparedness Program. Washington, DC. 2007.
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
18
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
History of the HPP
Number of HPP Grant Recipient States,
Municipalities, and Territories
Figure 2. Percent HPP Hospital Participation by Reporting States, Municipalities, and
Territories: 2006 (n = 58)96
25
15
7
6
3
100
90-99
80-89
70-79
1
60-69
50-59
1
40-49
Percentage of Hospitals Participating in the HPP
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law No. 107188) stipulated that funds received by an awardee could be provided directly to hospitals and other healthcare
organizations to enable them to undertake a variety of preparedness-oriented activities in accordance with the
awardee’s overall preparedness plan. While awardees are currently permitted to use a percentage of allocated
funds for certain direct and indirect costs, program guidance has recommended a specific pass-through amount
to hospitals. The pass-through amount has varied over time, but, starting in FY2003, the grant guidance has
recommended that awardees give hospitals and localities most of their funding (i.e., approximately 75% to 85%
of the total funds allocated to each state).97 HHS has proposed that the states provide a match of 5% of the HPP
award amount for FY2009, and a match amount of 10% starting in FY2010 for the duration of the program.98�
Program Guidance (FY2002–FY2008)
HHS has issued guidance for each HPP program year as part of the grant application process. This guidance has
evolved significantly since FY2002. Originally, the guidance consisted of preparedness benchmarks, such as having 500 hospital beds per million population that could be made available for treating bioterrorism victims. The
benchmarks represented the best judgment of the program leaders at the time. Over the years, these benchmarks shifted to sentinel indicators and, later, to performance measures that were thought to be more representative of actual emergency response capacities and capabilities within the healthcare system.
The evolution was not unexpected given that the HPP was a new program that was created quickly in response to
unprecedented events of national significance; changes in the program reflected experience that grew over time.
It also reflected an attempt by HHS to align the program with other national preparedness and response guidance
that was developed during the same period, including the White House Homeland Security Presidential Directives
and the DHS National Preparedness Goal and National Response Framework. In addition, within the HPP guidance, there was a growing emphasis on the importance of community-based preparedness and a gradual shift
away from the focus on individual hospitals.
96 Based on Center for Biosecurity analysis of 2006 ASPR end-of-year grant data.
97 HRSA (2003).
98 Department of Health and Human Services. Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP). Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness
and Response. Notice. 73 FR 28471 (May 16, 2008).
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
19
Hospitals Rising to the Challenge | March 2009
History of the HPP
Appendix D defines HPP guidance terminology and lists the years that these terms were used. Appendix E
includes a summary of program guidance for each year of the program (FY2002 through FY2008).99
Impact of Guidance Evolution on Data Collection and Reporting
The significant changes in the HPP program guidance since the program’s inception in FY2002 have both resulted
from and led to an evolving understanding of what constitutes the most important elements of hospital preparedness. While these changes were necessary and to be expected with the accumulation of experience, the rapidly
evolving complexity and scope of HPP guidance has made it difficult for hospitals to achieve and assess progress
toward the program’s goals.
Early data collection efforts by the HPP and by awardees reporting to the program were varied and difficult to
interpret. The data reported to the HPP provide only a snapshot of the changes that have occurred in selected
hospitals and communities as a result of the funding for emergency preparedness activities.100� Based on our
research, observations, and discussions, difficulties in assessing the HPP are the result of the following problems:
1.
HPP assessment programs have relied predominantly on qualitative, self-reported data from
awardees to monitor progress toward hospital preparedness, which has made it difficult to
assess the validity or comparability of responses.
2.
Early guidance focused on measuring capacity (e.g., equipment and supplies purchased an…

Order an Essay Now & Get These Features For Free:

Turnitin Report

Formatting

Title Page

Citation

Outline

Place an Order